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INTERACTIVE KINDS
January 27, 2011 at 10:46 pm. I can see OOO being a more expansive treatment of memetics and other idea theories. The meme theory never really took off for precisely the reasons that have plagued contemporary thought: on one side of the divide is the philosophers in love with language and signs, on the other side is the scientists in love with a crude ‘materialism’. BHASKAR AGAIN: THE REAL, THE ACTUAL, AND THE EMPIRICAL November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm. Dan, So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m stillreading it
CORRELATIONISM AND THE FATE OF PHILOSOPHY Correlationism and the Fate of Philosophy. Posted by larvalsubjects under Critique, Doxa, Enlightenment, Epistemology, Grounds, Materialism, Real, Truth. Comments. There are works of philosophy and theory that help clarify the thought of a particular philosopher or a particular concept without unsettling our presuppositions aboutthe
CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER It is a set of norms governing how concepts are to be operated on. Philosophy is inhabited by three main conceptual personae, but there are others as well. There is first the conceptual personae of the philosopher. Here it’s important to proceed with caution, for all three conceptual personae are referred to as philosophers in ordinaryEnglish.
LATOUR: NETWORKS, ACTORS AND COLLECTIVES Throughout his work, the object of Latour's analyses are networks. In our contemporary context the term "network" is misleading as it immediately brings to mind images of the internet, where computers are "networked" together through communications technologies. Although Latour's notion of networks is designed to underline relations among actors, his concept of networks refers to A BRIEF REMARK ON ACTANTS All that is to be attended to in the concept of actants is the manner in which they modify the action of other entities. Here are a few examples of actants: * Vinegar poured on baking soda. In its encounter with vinegar the baking soda behaves in ways that it would not otherwise behave. * A surprising result in a laboratory experiment. TOO COOL FOR SCHOOL: GREY VAMPIRES The grey vampire is paralyzed, frozen in a symptom, finding nothing but a world that falls short. In a very real sense, this compulsion to repeat is a repression of finitude and death. What the grey vampire cannot avow is that our actions and the world are finite, that there are no archimedean points. In finding guilt between every affirmative SIMONDON AND INDIVIDUATION Now that my summer session classes are over, I've finally been able to sit down and begin reading Gilbert Simondon's L'individuation: à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information, which is a combined reprint of his earlier works L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique and L'individuation psychique et collective. Readers familiar with Deleuze's Difference and THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY For Heidegger, the aim of this destruction of the history of ontology is to make the fundamental structures of this tradition explicit. If there is a problem in them remaining implicit, then this is because “ hen tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally andfor
BADIOU’S COUNT-AS-ONE Badiou’s Count-as-One. Dominic has written a very nice post entitled “Who’s Counting?”, on how, precisely, Badiou’s operation of the count-as-one in the formation of consistent multiplicities is to be understood. I confess that for me this is a central question with respect to Badiou’s ontology that I feel has received scanttreatment.
INTERACTIVE KINDS
January 27, 2011 at 10:46 pm. I can see OOO being a more expansive treatment of memetics and other idea theories. The meme theory never really took off for precisely the reasons that have plagued contemporary thought: on one side of the divide is the philosophers in love with language and signs, on the other side is the scientists in love with a crude ‘materialism’. BHASKAR AGAIN: THE REAL, THE ACTUAL, AND THE EMPIRICAL November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm. Dan, So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m stillreading it
CORRELATIONISM AND THE FATE OF PHILOSOPHY Correlationism and the Fate of Philosophy. Posted by larvalsubjects under Critique, Doxa, Enlightenment, Epistemology, Grounds, Materialism, Real, Truth. Comments. There are works of philosophy and theory that help clarify the thought of a particular philosopher or a particular concept without unsettling our presuppositions aboutthe
CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER It is a set of norms governing how concepts are to be operated on. Philosophy is inhabited by three main conceptual personae, but there are others as well. There is first the conceptual personae of the philosopher. Here it’s important to proceed with caution, for all three conceptual personae are referred to as philosophers in ordinaryEnglish.
LATOUR: NETWORKS, ACTORS AND COLLECTIVES Throughout his work, the object of Latour's analyses are networks. In our contemporary context the term "network" is misleading as it immediately brings to mind images of the internet, where computers are "networked" together through communications technologies. Although Latour's notion of networks is designed to underline relations among actors, his concept of networks refers to A BRIEF REMARK ON ACTANTS All that is to be attended to in the concept of actants is the manner in which they modify the action of other entities. Here are a few examples of actants: * Vinegar poured on baking soda. In its encounter with vinegar the baking soda behaves in ways that it would not otherwise behave. * A surprising result in a laboratory experiment. TOO COOL FOR SCHOOL: GREY VAMPIRES The grey vampire is paralyzed, frozen in a symptom, finding nothing but a world that falls short. In a very real sense, this compulsion to repeat is a repression of finitude and death. What the grey vampire cannot avow is that our actions and the world are finite, that there are no archimedean points. In finding guilt between every affirmative SIMONDON AND INDIVIDUATION Now that my summer session classes are over, I've finally been able to sit down and begin reading Gilbert Simondon's L'individuation: à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information, which is a combined reprint of his earlier works L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique and L'individuation psychique et collective. Readers familiar with Deleuze's Difference and THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY For Heidegger, the aim of this destruction of the history of ontology is to make the fundamental structures of this tradition explicit. If there is a problem in them remaining implicit, then this is because “ hen tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally andfor
OF QUASI-OBJECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVES June 19, 2011 at 10:36 am. Thank you for a very insightful post! I believe that the Latourian amodernism is the most important contribution to thinking the role of the social sciences anew. However, Latour himself has mostly been concerned with the issue of hybrids (or quasi-objects) in the natural sciences (such as microbes). DIFFERENCE IN ITSELF Difference is the state in which one can speak of determination as such. The difference ‘between’ two things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However, instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself– and yet that from which it distinguishes OVERRATED PHILOSOPHERS February 26, 2010 at 2:25 am. Probably the wrong crowd to mesh with your perspective, but I found it interesting that in a poll of mainly Anglophone philosophers, Wittgenstein was the only 20th-century figure to make the “top 20 of all time” list at all, and therefore it seems the only candidate for being overrated (by them).. I think you’re right on Russell not being generally STIEGLER, SIMONDON, AND HYPEROBJECTS: NON-ANTHROPOCENTRIC Earlier I discussed the possibility of technical fields as hyperobjects. Later in the first chapter of Technics and Time, Stiegler discusses the non-anthropomorphic dimension of technology as outlined by Simondon. Once again, my aim here is not so much to outline the nature of technology, but to unfold the nature of hyperobjects. As Stiegler writes, THE ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE– UNIVOCITY AND THE DEMOCRACY OF The Ontological Principle thus announces a democracy of being as opposed to an aristocracy of being, insofar as there is no sovereign form of being (forms, categories, subject, signifier, God, etc) that coordinates the rest without itself being coordinated in terms. All beings are equal in the sense that all beings are and insofar as allare
THE NORMATIVE FALLACY The Normative Fallacy occurs, rather, when someone attempts to argue that something is not the case or is the case based on a set of ideological, ethical, moral, political, or other normative commitments. I often sense this sort of reasoning at work in some appropriations of Foucault, though generally it takes the form of anenthymeme.
THE SPLENDOR OF THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI March 2, 2016 at 3:39 pm. And this (“your capacity to be self-determining and self-creating and your capacity to be something other thanyour biological nature”) is also what Henry Nelson Wieman (who also spoke in terms of the Event) was talking about in his first book, Religious Experience and Scientific Method (1926), when he wrote “Whatever the word God may mean, it is a term used HEGEL’S CONCEPTION OF ESSENCE Hegel writes that: When we speak of ‘essence’, we distinguish it from being, i.e., from what is immediate . In comparison with essence, we regard being as a mere semblance . But this semblance is not simply ‘not’; it is not an utter nothing, ratherit is
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY For Heidegger, the aim of this destruction of the history of ontology is to make the fundamental structures of this tradition explicit. If there is a problem in them remaining implicit, then this is because “ hen tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally andfor
DELEUZE AND VITALISM: UPDATED March 3, 2009 at 9:19 am. It seems that what may still be going on is that we’re confusing the more specific philosophical notion of vitalism (often foisted on Schelling, Bergson, Deleuze, and a few others who work with an “organic” metaphysical vocabulary) with a general and outdated scientific theory that was once called “vitalism” (wherein there was a sort of not scientifically BADIOU’S COUNT-AS-ONE Dominic has written a very nice post entitled "Who's Counting?", on how, precisely, Badiou's operation of the count-as-one in the formation of consistent multiplicities is to be understood. I confess that for me this is a central question with respect to Badiou's ontology that I feel has received scant treatment. I'm fine with thenotion
CORRELATIONISM AND THE FATE OF PHILOSOPHY There are works of philosophy and theory that help clarify the thought of a particular philosopher or a particular concept without unsettling our presuppositions about the nature, key assumptions, and primary aims of philosophy. There are then works of philosophy that remind us what philosophy itself is, which call us to philosophy, and which have THE ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE– UNIVOCITY AND THE DEMOCRACY OF If, as the Ontic Principle affirms, there is no difference that does not make a difference, then the Ontological Principle directly follows. Deleuze, following Duns Scotus, gives a particularly clear formulation of the Ontological Principle: Being is said in a single and same sense of all its individuating differences or intrinsicmodalities.
A BRIEF REMARK ON ACTANTS In a recent response to one of my posts, Ross writes:. Ah, well, with all this reading of Leibniz it’s no wonder that you ascribe some sort of teleological agency to nature, and for that matter, the entire non-human universe.. Here it’s incredibly important to emphasize that I don’t ascribe teleology to all things. Indeed, I believe that teleology is even rather limited in the case of THE SPLENDOR OF THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI March 2, 2016 at 3:39 pm. And this (“your capacity to be self-determining and self-creating and your capacity to be something other thanyour biological nature”) is also what Henry Nelson Wieman (who also spoke in terms of the Event) was talking about in his first book, Religious Experience and Scientific Method (1926), when he wrote “Whatever the word God may mean, it is a term used TOO COOL FOR SCHOOL: GREY VAMPIRES Recently a friend of mine confessed that he is one corny, cheesy, sentimental son of a bitch. Try as he might, he said, he cannot pull of that jaded, cynical, sardonic "too cool for school" thing that so many of his friends have down to a science. It seems to me that the"too cool
BHASKAR AGAIN: THE REAL, THE ACTUAL, AND THE EMPIRICAL November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm. Dan, So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m stillreading it
OVERRATED PHILOSOPHERS February 26, 2010 at 2:25 am. Probably the wrong crowd to mesh with your perspective, but I found it interesting that in a poll of mainly Anglophone philosophers, Wittgenstein was the only 20th-century figure to make the “top 20 of all time” list at all, and therefore it seems the only candidate for being overrated (by them).. I think you’re right on Russell not being generally CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER Deleuze and Guattari coin the term "conceptual personae" in What is Philosophy? My aim here is not to retain true to their signification of the term, though I am vaguely influenced by it. In other words, I'm not interested in a discussion of what Deleuze and Guattari really meant by "conceptual personae". If I've gotten it SOME REMARKS ON LATOUR, MEREOLOGY, AND ACTANTS May 14, 2010 at 8:16 pm. I’m a bit in a hurry here in defense of Latour’s ANT position: the approach is made for taking seriously the entangling moves in assemblages that have humans in them. it allows a kind of ethnography or at least to take serious humans-among-others with their practical metaphysics. to go in and a priori have a conception of what BADIOU’S COUNT-AS-ONE Dominic has written a very nice post entitled "Who's Counting?", on how, precisely, Badiou's operation of the count-as-one in the formation of consistent multiplicities is to be understood. I confess that for me this is a central question with respect to Badiou's ontology that I feel has received scant treatment. I'm fine with thenotion
CORRELATIONISM AND THE FATE OF PHILOSOPHY There are works of philosophy and theory that help clarify the thought of a particular philosopher or a particular concept without unsettling our presuppositions about the nature, key assumptions, and primary aims of philosophy. There are then works of philosophy that remind us what philosophy itself is, which call us to philosophy, and which have THE ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE– UNIVOCITY AND THE DEMOCRACY OF If, as the Ontic Principle affirms, there is no difference that does not make a difference, then the Ontological Principle directly follows. Deleuze, following Duns Scotus, gives a particularly clear formulation of the Ontological Principle: Being is said in a single and same sense of all its individuating differences or intrinsicmodalities.
A BRIEF REMARK ON ACTANTS In a recent response to one of my posts, Ross writes:. Ah, well, with all this reading of Leibniz it’s no wonder that you ascribe some sort of teleological agency to nature, and for that matter, the entire non-human universe.. Here it’s incredibly important to emphasize that I don’t ascribe teleology to all things. Indeed, I believe that teleology is even rather limited in the case of THE SPLENDOR OF THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI March 2, 2016 at 3:39 pm. And this (“your capacity to be self-determining and self-creating and your capacity to be something other thanyour biological nature”) is also what Henry Nelson Wieman (who also spoke in terms of the Event) was talking about in his first book, Religious Experience and Scientific Method (1926), when he wrote “Whatever the word God may mean, it is a term used TOO COOL FOR SCHOOL: GREY VAMPIRES Recently a friend of mine confessed that he is one corny, cheesy, sentimental son of a bitch. Try as he might, he said, he cannot pull of that jaded, cynical, sardonic "too cool for school" thing that so many of his friends have down to a science. It seems to me that the"too cool
BHASKAR AGAIN: THE REAL, THE ACTUAL, AND THE EMPIRICAL November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm. Dan, So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m stillreading it
OVERRATED PHILOSOPHERS February 26, 2010 at 2:25 am. Probably the wrong crowd to mesh with your perspective, but I found it interesting that in a poll of mainly Anglophone philosophers, Wittgenstein was the only 20th-century figure to make the “top 20 of all time” list at all, and therefore it seems the only candidate for being overrated (by them).. I think you’re right on Russell not being generally CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER Deleuze and Guattari coin the term "conceptual personae" in What is Philosophy? My aim here is not to retain true to their signification of the term, though I am vaguely influenced by it. In other words, I'm not interested in a discussion of what Deleuze and Guattari really meant by "conceptual personae". If I've gotten it SOME REMARKS ON LATOUR, MEREOLOGY, AND ACTANTS May 14, 2010 at 8:16 pm. I’m a bit in a hurry here in defense of Latour’s ANT position: the approach is made for taking seriously the entangling moves in assemblages that have humans in them. it allows a kind of ethnography or at least to take serious humans-among-others with their practical metaphysics. to go in and a priori have a conception of what A BRIEF REMARK ON ACTANTS In a recent response to one of my posts, Ross writes:. Ah, well, with all this reading of Leibniz it’s no wonder that you ascribe some sort of teleological agency to nature, and for that matter, the entire non-human universe.. Here it’s incredibly important to emphasize that I don’t ascribe teleology to all things. Indeed, I believe that teleology is even rather limited in the case of TRYING TO MOVE BEYOND ANTHROPOCENTRISM: SOME THOUGHTS IN Over at Being's Poem my friend Daniel has a very generous and thoughtful response to my response to his review of The Democracy of Objects. Let me emphasize that Daniel and I are good friends. Whenever we get together we have a great time with each other. One ONTICOLOGY– A MANIFESTO FOR OBJECT-ORIENTED ONTOLOGY PART Context We live in a world pervaded by objects of all kinds, yet nowhere do we have a unified theory or ontology of objects. Whether we are speaking of technological objects, natural objects, commodities, events, groups, animals, institutions, gods, or semiotic objects our historical moment, far from reducing the number of existing objects asalleged
STIEGLER, SIMONDON, AND HYPEROBJECTS: NON-ANTHROPOCENTRIC Earlier I discussed the possibility of technical fields as hyperobjects. Later in the first chapter of Technics and Time, Stiegler discusses the non-anthropomorphic dimension of technology as outlined by Simondon. Once again, my aim here is not so much to outline the nature of technology, but to unfold the nature of hyperobjects. As Stiegler writes, OVERRATED PHILOSOPHERS February 26, 2010 at 2:25 am. Probably the wrong crowd to mesh with your perspective, but I found it interesting that in a poll of mainly Anglophone philosophers, Wittgenstein was the only 20th-century figure to make the “top 20 of all time” list at all, and therefore it seems the only candidate for being overrated (by them).. I think you’re right on Russell not being generally SOME REMARKS ON LATOUR, MEREOLOGY, AND ACTANTS May 14, 2010 at 8:16 pm. I’m a bit in a hurry here in defense of Latour’s ANT position: the approach is made for taking seriously the entangling moves in assemblages that have humans in them. it allows a kind of ethnography or at least to take serious humans-among-others with their practical metaphysics. to go in and a priori have a conception of what LET’S TALK ABOUT JOUISSANCE, BABY! March 28, 2013 at 1:04 am. Joseph, That’s the standard story about jouissance, but whenever I try to think it through systematically I keep coming back to this question of why Lacan would say that desire is a defense against jouissance. If desire wants jouissance (or thinks it does) as you suggest, it’s very difficult to understand this thesis. So I guess the question is, why is there a PLEASURE VERSUS JOUISSANCE A few days ago I suggested that psychoanalysis poses a fundamental challenge to Epicurean and Spinozist frameworks of ethics. Some responded by pointing out that perhaps we can establish a consistency between psychoanalysis and Spinoza on the ground of inadequate ideas. The symptom, says Lacan, is a sort of unknown knowledge. As he remarksin The
DELEUZE AND VITALISM: UPDATED March 3, 2009 at 9:19 am. It seems that what may still be going on is that we’re confusing the more specific philosophical notion of vitalism (often foisted on Schelling, Bergson, Deleuze, and a few others who work with an “organic” metaphysical vocabulary) with a general and outdated scientific theory that was once called “vitalism” (wherein there was a sort of not scientifically CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER Deleuze and Guattari coin the term "conceptual personae" in What is Philosophy? My aim here is not to retain true to their signification of the term, though I am vaguely influenced by it. In other words, I'm not interested in a discussion of what Deleuze and Guattari really meant by "conceptual personae". If I've gotten it BADIOU’S COUNT-AS-ONE Badiou’s Count-as-One. Dominic has written a very nice post entitled “Who’s Counting?”, on how, precisely, Badiou’s operation of the count-as-one in the formation of consistent multiplicities is to be understood. I confess that for me this is a central question with respect to Badiou’s ontology that I feel has received scanttreatment.
LATOUR’S PRINCIPLE OF IRREDUCTION As I read it, Latour’s principle of irreduction actually has four parts – well, three plus a clarification. People tend to fixate on the first part and miss the rest. Here it is in full: “1.1.1 Nothing is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything else.INTERACTIVE KINDS
January 27, 2011 at 10:46 pm. I can see OOO being a more expansive treatment of memetics and other idea theories. The meme theory never really took off for precisely the reasons that have plagued contemporary thought: on one side of the divide is the philosophers in love with language and signs, on the other side is the scientists in love with a crude ‘materialism’. CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER It is a set of norms governing how concepts are to be operated on. Philosophy is inhabited by three main conceptual personae, but there are others as well. There is first the conceptual personae of the philosopher. Here it’s important to proceed with caution, for all three conceptual personae are referred to as philosophers in ordinaryEnglish.
LATOUR: NETWORKS, ACTORS AND COLLECTIVES Throughout his work, the object of Latour's analyses are networks. In our contemporary context the term "network" is misleading as it immediately brings to mind images of the internet, where computers are "networked" together through communications technologies. Although Latour's notion of networks is designed to underline relations among actors, his concept of networks refers to BHASKAR AGAIN: THE REAL, THE ACTUAL, AND THE EMPIRICAL November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm. Dan, So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m stillreading it
CORRELATIONISM AND THE FATE OF PHILOSOPHY Correlationism and the Fate of Philosophy. Posted by larvalsubjects under Critique, Doxa, Enlightenment, Epistemology, Grounds, Materialism, Real, Truth. Comments. There are works of philosophy and theory that help clarify the thought of a particular philosopher or a particular concept without unsettling our presuppositions aboutthe
A BRIEF REMARK ON ACTANTS All that is to be attended to in the concept of actants is the manner in which they modify the action of other entities. Here are a few examples of actants: * Vinegar poured on baking soda. In its encounter with vinegar the baking soda behaves in ways that it would not otherwise behave. * A surprising result in a laboratory experiment. SIMONDON AND INDIVIDUATION Now that my summer session classes are over, I've finally been able to sit down and begin reading Gilbert Simondon's L'individuation: à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information, which is a combined reprint of his earlier works L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique and L'individuation psychique et collective. Readers familiar with Deleuze's Difference and THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY For Heidegger, the aim of this destruction of the history of ontology is to make the fundamental structures of this tradition explicit. If there is a problem in them remaining implicit, then this is because “ hen tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally andfor
BADIOU’S COUNT-AS-ONE Badiou’s Count-as-One. Dominic has written a very nice post entitled “Who’s Counting?”, on how, precisely, Badiou’s operation of the count-as-one in the formation of consistent multiplicities is to be understood. I confess that for me this is a central question with respect to Badiou’s ontology that I feel has received scanttreatment.
LATOUR’S PRINCIPLE OF IRREDUCTION As I read it, Latour’s principle of irreduction actually has four parts – well, three plus a clarification. People tend to fixate on the first part and miss the rest. Here it is in full: “1.1.1 Nothing is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything else.INTERACTIVE KINDS
January 27, 2011 at 10:46 pm. I can see OOO being a more expansive treatment of memetics and other idea theories. The meme theory never really took off for precisely the reasons that have plagued contemporary thought: on one side of the divide is the philosophers in love with language and signs, on the other side is the scientists in love with a crude ‘materialism’. CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER It is a set of norms governing how concepts are to be operated on. Philosophy is inhabited by three main conceptual personae, but there are others as well. There is first the conceptual personae of the philosopher. Here it’s important to proceed with caution, for all three conceptual personae are referred to as philosophers in ordinaryEnglish.
LATOUR: NETWORKS, ACTORS AND COLLECTIVES Throughout his work, the object of Latour's analyses are networks. In our contemporary context the term "network" is misleading as it immediately brings to mind images of the internet, where computers are "networked" together through communications technologies. Although Latour's notion of networks is designed to underline relations among actors, his concept of networks refers to BHASKAR AGAIN: THE REAL, THE ACTUAL, AND THE EMPIRICAL November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm. Dan, So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m stillreading it
CORRELATIONISM AND THE FATE OF PHILOSOPHY Correlationism and the Fate of Philosophy. Posted by larvalsubjects under Critique, Doxa, Enlightenment, Epistemology, Grounds, Materialism, Real, Truth. Comments. There are works of philosophy and theory that help clarify the thought of a particular philosopher or a particular concept without unsettling our presuppositions aboutthe
A BRIEF REMARK ON ACTANTS All that is to be attended to in the concept of actants is the manner in which they modify the action of other entities. Here are a few examples of actants: * Vinegar poured on baking soda. In its encounter with vinegar the baking soda behaves in ways that it would not otherwise behave. * A surprising result in a laboratory experiment. SIMONDON AND INDIVIDUATION Now that my summer session classes are over, I've finally been able to sit down and begin reading Gilbert Simondon's L'individuation: à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information, which is a combined reprint of his earlier works L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique and L'individuation psychique et collective. Readers familiar with Deleuze's Difference and THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY For Heidegger, the aim of this destruction of the history of ontology is to make the fundamental structures of this tradition explicit. If there is a problem in them remaining implicit, then this is because “ hen tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally andfor
CORRELATIONISM AND THE FATE OF PHILOSOPHY Correlationism and the Fate of Philosophy. Posted by larvalsubjects under Critique, Doxa, Enlightenment, Epistemology, Grounds, Materialism, Real, Truth. Comments. There are works of philosophy and theory that help clarify the thought of a particular philosopher or a particular concept without unsettling our presuppositions aboutthe
DIFFERENCE IN ITSELF Difference is the state in which one can speak of determination as such. The difference ‘between’ two things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However, instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself– and yet that from which it distinguishes OVERRATED PHILOSOPHERS February 26, 2010 at 2:25 am. Probably the wrong crowd to mesh with your perspective, but I found it interesting that in a poll of mainly Anglophone philosophers, Wittgenstein was the only 20th-century figure to make the “top 20 of all time” list at all, and therefore it seems the only candidate for being overrated (by them).. I think you’re right on Russell not being generally LATOUR’S PRINCIPLE OF IRREDUCTION If I were to name a single thing that I most regret in all that I have written in since 2011, it would be my defense of Latour’s principle of irreduction in my article entitled “The Ontic Principle” in The Speculative Turn.. Having reflected on this principle in the intervening years, I can’t help but believe that it would be a catastrophe to any knowledge-producing practices were it STIEGLER, SIMONDON, AND HYPEROBJECTS: NON-ANTHROPOCENTRIC Earlier I discussed the possibility of technical fields as hyperobjects. Later in the first chapter of Technics and Time, Stiegler discusses the non-anthropomorphic dimension of technology as outlined by Simondon. Once again, my aim here is not so much to outline the nature of technology, but to unfold the nature of hyperobjects. As Stiegler writes, THE NORMATIVE FALLACY The Normative Fallacy occurs, rather, when someone attempts to argue that something is not the case or is the case based on a set of ideological, ethical, moral, political, or other normative commitments. I often sense this sort of reasoning at work in some appropriations of Foucault, though generally it takes the form of anenthymeme.
THE SPLENDOR OF THE SYNTHETIC A PRIORI That’s empiricism. The rule of the magician. But the synthetic a priori is real magic. From thought alone you’re getting more out of the hat than you put there in the first place. When Kant says that 7+5 = 12 is not an analytic a priori judgment, nor a synthetic a posteriori judgment, but a synthetic a priori judgment, he’s sayingthat
OF QUASI-OBJECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVES June 19, 2011 at 10:36 am. Thank you for a very insightful post! I believe that the Latourian amodernism is the most important contribution to thinking the role of the social sciences anew. However, Latour himself has mostly been concerned with the issue of hybrids (or quasi-objects) in the natural sciences (such as microbes). THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY For Heidegger, the aim of this destruction of the history of ontology is to make the fundamental structures of this tradition explicit. If there is a problem in them remaining implicit, then this is because “ hen tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally andfor
DELEUZE AND VITALISM: UPDATED March 3, 2009 at 9:19 am. It seems that what may still be going on is that we’re confusing the more specific philosophical notion of vitalism (often foisted on Schelling, Bergson, Deleuze, and a few others who work with an “organic” metaphysical vocabulary) with a general and outdated scientific theory that was once called “vitalism” (wherein there was a sort of not scientifically NARCISSISM | LARVAL SUBJECTS A brief post before dinner for thoughts that need to be developed in greater detail. In an interview somewhere or other I vaguely remember that Derrida says that his project, from beginning to end, is an interrogation and deconstruction of narcissism. Given Derrida's profound critique of the logic of identity, this comes as no surprise, BADIOU’S COUNT-AS-ONE Badiou’s Count-as-One. Dominic has written a very nice post entitled “Who’s Counting?”, on how, precisely, Badiou’s operation of the count-as-one in the formation of consistent multiplicities is to be understood. I confess that for me this is a central question with respect to Badiou’s ontology that I feel has received scanttreatment.
LOVE | LARVAL SUBJECTS Disjunctive love is a love that somehow occurs in divergent worlds that nonetheless occupy the same earth. read on! Here, to fall in love is to fall in love with a world that one cannot assimilate, consume, or domesticate. This is queer love. In disjunctive love the lovers are withdrawn from one another as worlds, yet still somehow in relation. BHASKAR AGAIN: THE REAL, THE ACTUAL, AND THE EMPIRICAL November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm. Dan, So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m stillreading it
LATOUR’S PRINCIPLE OF IRREDUCTION As I read it, Latour’s principle of irreduction actually has four parts – well, three plus a clarification. People tend to fixate on the first part and miss the rest. Here it is in full: “1.1.1 Nothing is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything else. OF QUASI-OBJECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVES June 19, 2011 at 10:36 am. Thank you for a very insightful post! I believe that the Latourian amodernism is the most important contribution to thinking the role of the social sciences anew. However, Latour himself has mostly been concerned with the issue of hybrids (or quasi-objects) in the natural sciences (such as microbes). TOO COOL FOR SCHOOL: GREY VAMPIRES The grey vampire is paralyzed, frozen in a symptom, finding nothing but a world that falls short. In a very real sense, this compulsion to repeat is a repression of finitude and death. What the grey vampire cannot avow is that our actions and the world are finite, that there are no archimedean points. In finding guilt between every affirmative CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER It is a set of norms governing how concepts are to be operated on. Philosophy is inhabited by three main conceptual personae, but there are others as well. There is first the conceptual personae of the philosopher. Here it’s important to proceed with caution, for all three conceptual personae are referred to as philosophers in ordinaryEnglish.
THE TRAUMA OF DARWIN Growing up one of my great passions was biology. Indeed, as a child my ardent wish was to be a marine biologist. Towards this end my days, much to the dismay of my mother, would be spent in the creek behind the house observing wildlife and catching the unfortunate critters that came my way. My SOME REMARKS ON LATOUR, MEREOLOGY, AND ACTANTS May 14, 2010 at 8:16 pm. I’m a bit in a hurry here in defense of Latour’s ANT position: the approach is made for taking seriously the entangling moves in assemblages that have humans in them. it allows a kind of ethnography or at least to take serious humans-among-others with their practical metaphysics. to go in and a priori have a conception of what NARCISSISM | LARVAL SUBJECTS A brief post before dinner for thoughts that need to be developed in greater detail. In an interview somewhere or other I vaguely remember that Derrida says that his project, from beginning to end, is an interrogation and deconstruction of narcissism. Given Derrida's profound critique of the logic of identity, this comes as no surprise, BADIOU’S COUNT-AS-ONE Badiou’s Count-as-One. Dominic has written a very nice post entitled “Who’s Counting?”, on how, precisely, Badiou’s operation of the count-as-one in the formation of consistent multiplicities is to be understood. I confess that for me this is a central question with respect to Badiou’s ontology that I feel has received scanttreatment.
LOVE | LARVAL SUBJECTS Disjunctive love is a love that somehow occurs in divergent worlds that nonetheless occupy the same earth. read on! Here, to fall in love is to fall in love with a world that one cannot assimilate, consume, or domesticate. This is queer love. In disjunctive love the lovers are withdrawn from one another as worlds, yet still somehow in relation. BHASKAR AGAIN: THE REAL, THE ACTUAL, AND THE EMPIRICAL November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm. Dan, So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m stillreading it
LATOUR’S PRINCIPLE OF IRREDUCTION As I read it, Latour’s principle of irreduction actually has four parts – well, three plus a clarification. People tend to fixate on the first part and miss the rest. Here it is in full: “1.1.1 Nothing is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything else. OF QUASI-OBJECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVES June 19, 2011 at 10:36 am. Thank you for a very insightful post! I believe that the Latourian amodernism is the most important contribution to thinking the role of the social sciences anew. However, Latour himself has mostly been concerned with the issue of hybrids (or quasi-objects) in the natural sciences (such as microbes). TOO COOL FOR SCHOOL: GREY VAMPIRES The grey vampire is paralyzed, frozen in a symptom, finding nothing but a world that falls short. In a very real sense, this compulsion to repeat is a repression of finitude and death. What the grey vampire cannot avow is that our actions and the world are finite, that there are no archimedean points. In finding guilt between every affirmative CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER It is a set of norms governing how concepts are to be operated on. Philosophy is inhabited by three main conceptual personae, but there are others as well. There is first the conceptual personae of the philosopher. Here it’s important to proceed with caution, for all three conceptual personae are referred to as philosophers in ordinaryEnglish.
THE TRAUMA OF DARWIN Growing up one of my great passions was biology. Indeed, as a child my ardent wish was to be a marine biologist. Towards this end my days, much to the dismay of my mother, would be spent in the creek behind the house observing wildlife and catching the unfortunate critters that came my way. My SOME REMARKS ON LATOUR, MEREOLOGY, AND ACTANTS May 14, 2010 at 8:16 pm. I’m a bit in a hurry here in defense of Latour’s ANT position: the approach is made for taking seriously the entangling moves in assemblages that have humans in them. it allows a kind of ethnography or at least to take serious humans-among-others with their practical metaphysics. to go in and a priori have a conception of what SOME REMARKS ON LATOUR, MEREOLOGY, AND ACTANTS May 14, 2010 at 8:16 pm. I’m a bit in a hurry here in defense of Latour’s ANT position: the approach is made for taking seriously the entangling moves in assemblages that have humans in them. it allows a kind of ethnography or at least to take serious humans-among-others with their practical metaphysics. to go in and a priori have a conception of what DELEUZE: WHAT IS CALLED THINKING? A delicate problem animates chapter 3 of Difference and Repetition. Deleuze wants to defend a pure concept of difference, an account of difference in itself, yet our experience is representational through and through. Everywhere we are creatures of habit that recognize beings and therefore do not encounter difference. We subordinate the beings of our experience to the OF QUASI-OBJECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVES June 19, 2011 at 10:36 am. Thank you for a very insightful post! I believe that the Latourian amodernism is the most important contribution to thinking the role of the social sciences anew. However, Latour himself has mostly been concerned with the issue of hybrids (or quasi-objects) in the natural sciences (such as microbes). A BRIEF REMARK ON ACTANTS All that is to be attended to in the concept of actants is the manner in which they modify the action of other entities. Here are a few examples of actants: * Vinegar poured on baking soda. In its encounter with vinegar the baking soda behaves in ways that it would not otherwise behave. * A surprising result in a laboratory experiment. CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER It is a set of norms governing how concepts are to be operated on. Philosophy is inhabited by three main conceptual personae, but there are others as well. There is first the conceptual personae of the philosopher. Here it’s important to proceed with caution, for all three conceptual personae are referred to as philosophers in ordinaryEnglish.
DIFFERENCE IN ITSELF Difference is the state in which one can speak of determination as such. The difference ‘between’ two things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However, instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself– and yet that from which it distinguishes CORRELATIONISM AND THE FATE OF PHILOSOPHY Correlationism and the Fate of Philosophy. Posted by larvalsubjects under Critique, Doxa, Enlightenment, Epistemology, Grounds, Materialism, Real, Truth. Comments. There are works of philosophy and theory that help clarify the thought of a particular philosopher or a particular concept without unsettling our presuppositions aboutthe
STIEGLER, SIMONDON, AND HYPEROBJECTS: NON-ANTHROPOCENTRIC Earlier I discussed the possibility of technical fields as hyperobjects. Later in the first chapter of Technics and Time, Stiegler discusses the non-anthropomorphic dimension of technology as outlined by Simondon. Once again, my aim here is not so much to outline the nature of technology, but to unfold the nature of hyperobjects. As Stiegler writes, ONTICOLOGY– A MANIFESTO FOR OBJECT-ORIENTED ONTOLOGY PART This alternative first requires a fourth blow to human narcissism, where man is dethroned from his position of centrality in the order of being and situated in his proper place as one being among others, no more or less important than these others. manifesto for ObjectOriented Ontology
OVERRATED PHILOSOPHERS February 26, 2010 at 2:25 am. Probably the wrong crowd to mesh with your perspective, but I found it interesting that in a poll of mainly Anglophone philosophers, Wittgenstein was the only 20th-century figure to make the “top 20 of all time” list at all, and therefore it seems the only candidate for being overrated (by them).. I think you’re right on Russell not being generally NARCISSISM | LARVAL SUBJECTS A brief post before dinner for thoughts that need to be developed in greater detail. In an interview somewhere or other I vaguely remember that Derrida says that his project, from beginning to end, is an interrogation and deconstruction of narcissism. Given Derrida's profound critique of the logic of identity, this comes as no surprise, BADIOU’S COUNT-AS-ONE Badiou’s Count-as-One. Dominic has written a very nice post entitled “Who’s Counting?”, on how, precisely, Badiou’s operation of the count-as-one in the formation of consistent multiplicities is to be understood. I confess that for me this is a central question with respect to Badiou’s ontology that I feel has received scanttreatment.
CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER It is a set of norms governing how concepts are to be operated on. Philosophy is inhabited by three main conceptual personae, but there are others as well. There is first the conceptual personae of the philosopher. Here it’s important to proceed with caution, for all three conceptual personae are referred to as philosophers in ordinaryEnglish.
LATOUR: NETWORKS, ACTORS AND COLLECTIVES Throughout his work, the object of Latour's analyses are networks. In our contemporary context the term "network" is misleading as it immediately brings to mind images of the internet, where computers are "networked" together through communications technologies. Although Latour's notion of networks is designed to underline relations among actors, his concept of networks refers toINTERACTIVE KINDS
January 27, 2011 at 10:46 pm. I can see OOO being a more expansive treatment of memetics and other idea theories. The meme theory never really took off for precisely the reasons that have plagued contemporary thought: on one side of the divide is the philosophers in love with language and signs, on the other side is the scientists in love with a crude ‘materialism’. BHASKAR AGAIN: THE REAL, THE ACTUAL, AND THE EMPIRICAL November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm. Dan, So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m stillreading it
DIFFERENCE IN ITSELF Difference is the state in which one can speak of determination as such. The difference ‘between’ two things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However, instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself– and yet that from which it distinguishes OF QUASI-OBJECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVES June 19, 2011 at 10:36 am. Thank you for a very insightful post! I believe that the Latourian amodernism is the most important contribution to thinking the role of the social sciences anew. However, Latour himself has mostly been concerned with the issue of hybrids (or quasi-objects) in the natural sciences (such as microbes). SIMONDON AND INDIVIDUATION Now that my summer session classes are over, I've finally been able to sit down and begin reading Gilbert Simondon's L'individuation: à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information, which is a combined reprint of his earlier works L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique and L'individuation psychique et collective. Readers familiar with Deleuze's Difference and THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY For Heidegger, the aim of this destruction of the history of ontology is to make the fundamental structures of this tradition explicit. If there is a problem in them remaining implicit, then this is because “ hen tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally andfor
NARCISSISM | LARVAL SUBJECTS A brief post before dinner for thoughts that need to be developed in greater detail. In an interview somewhere or other I vaguely remember that Derrida says that his project, from beginning to end, is an interrogation and deconstruction of narcissism. Given Derrida's profound critique of the logic of identity, this comes as no surprise, BADIOU’S COUNT-AS-ONE Badiou’s Count-as-One. Dominic has written a very nice post entitled “Who’s Counting?”, on how, precisely, Badiou’s operation of the count-as-one in the formation of consistent multiplicities is to be understood. I confess that for me this is a central question with respect to Badiou’s ontology that I feel has received scanttreatment.
CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER It is a set of norms governing how concepts are to be operated on. Philosophy is inhabited by three main conceptual personae, but there are others as well. There is first the conceptual personae of the philosopher. Here it’s important to proceed with caution, for all three conceptual personae are referred to as philosophers in ordinaryEnglish.
LATOUR: NETWORKS, ACTORS AND COLLECTIVES Throughout his work, the object of Latour's analyses are networks. In our contemporary context the term "network" is misleading as it immediately brings to mind images of the internet, where computers are "networked" together through communications technologies. Although Latour's notion of networks is designed to underline relations among actors, his concept of networks refers toINTERACTIVE KINDS
January 27, 2011 at 10:46 pm. I can see OOO being a more expansive treatment of memetics and other idea theories. The meme theory never really took off for precisely the reasons that have plagued contemporary thought: on one side of the divide is the philosophers in love with language and signs, on the other side is the scientists in love with a crude ‘materialism’. BHASKAR AGAIN: THE REAL, THE ACTUAL, AND THE EMPIRICAL November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm. Dan, So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m stillreading it
DIFFERENCE IN ITSELF Difference is the state in which one can speak of determination as such. The difference ‘between’ two things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However, instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself– and yet that from which it distinguishes OF QUASI-OBJECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVES June 19, 2011 at 10:36 am. Thank you for a very insightful post! I believe that the Latourian amodernism is the most important contribution to thinking the role of the social sciences anew. However, Latour himself has mostly been concerned with the issue of hybrids (or quasi-objects) in the natural sciences (such as microbes). SIMONDON AND INDIVIDUATION Now that my summer session classes are over, I've finally been able to sit down and begin reading Gilbert Simondon's L'individuation: à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information, which is a combined reprint of his earlier works L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique and L'individuation psychique et collective. Readers familiar with Deleuze's Difference and THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY For Heidegger, the aim of this destruction of the history of ontology is to make the fundamental structures of this tradition explicit. If there is a problem in them remaining implicit, then this is because “ hen tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally andfor
MACHINE-ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE: EXPERIMENTS IN ABSOLUTE Absolute architecture explores what the void can do and what can be done with the void. It explores a spatialization, a series of permutations, in and for itself. In this regard, absolute architecture is Riemannian . Rather than exploring architecture in terms of an embedding space (the field of functions or uses to which an enclosureis put
LOVE | LARVAL SUBJECTS Disjunctive love is a love that somehow occurs in divergent worlds that nonetheless occupy the same earth. read on! Here, to fall in love is to fall in love with a world that one cannot assimilate, consume, or domesticate. This is queer love. In disjunctive love the lovers are withdrawn from one another as worlds, yet still somehow in relation. DIFFERENCE IN ITSELF Difference is the state in which one can speak of determination as such. The difference ‘between’ two things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However, instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself– and yet that from which it distinguishes LATOUR’S PRINCIPLE OF IRREDUCTION As I read it, Latour’s principle of irreduction actually has four parts – well, three plus a clarification. People tend to fixate on the first part and miss the rest. Here it is in full: “1.1.1 Nothing is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything else. CORRELATIONISM AND THE FATE OF PHILOSOPHY Correlationism and the Fate of Philosophy. Posted by larvalsubjects under Critique, Doxa, Enlightenment, Epistemology, Grounds, Materialism, Real, Truth. Comments. There are works of philosophy and theory that help clarify the thought of a particular philosopher or a particular concept without unsettling our presuppositions aboutthe
A BRIEF REMARK ON ACTANTS All that is to be attended to in the concept of actants is the manner in which they modify the action of other entities. Here are a few examples of actants: * Vinegar poured on baking soda. In its encounter with vinegar the baking soda behaves in ways that it would not otherwise behave. * A surprising result in a laboratory experiment. STIEGLER, SIMONDON, AND HYPEROBJECTS: NON-ANTHROPOCENTRIC Earlier I discussed the possibility of technical fields as hyperobjects. Later in the first chapter of Technics and Time, Stiegler discusses the non-anthropomorphic dimension of technology as outlined by Simondon. Once again, my aim here is not so much to outline the nature of technology, but to unfold the nature of hyperobjects. As Stiegler writes, OVERRATED PHILOSOPHERS February 26, 2010 at 2:25 am. Probably the wrong crowd to mesh with your perspective, but I found it interesting that in a poll of mainly Anglophone philosophers, Wittgenstein was the only 20th-century figure to make the “top 20 of all time” list at all, and therefore it seems the only candidate for being overrated (by them).. I think you’re right on Russell not being generally THE NORMATIVE FALLACY The Normative Fallacy occurs, rather, when someone attempts to argue that something is not the case or is the case based on a set of ideological, ethical, moral, political, or other normative commitments. I often sense this sort of reasoning at work in some appropriations of Foucault, though generally it takes the form of anenthymeme.
STACY ALAIMO: POROUS BODIES AND TRANS-CORPOREALITY In De Rerum Natura Lucretius teaches that all bodies are porous. As he writes, But not all bodily matter is tight packed by nature's law, for there's a void in things. Were there no void, they would not only lack this restlessness of motion altogether, but more than that-- NARCISSISM | LARVAL SUBJECTS A brief post before dinner for thoughts that need to be developed in greater detail. In an interview somewhere or other I vaguely remember that Derrida says that his project, from beginning to end, is an interrogation and deconstruction of narcissism. Given Derrida's profound critique of the logic of identity, this comes as no surprise, BADIOU’S COUNT-AS-ONE Badiou’s Count-as-One. Dominic has written a very nice post entitled “Who’s Counting?”, on how, precisely, Badiou’s operation of the count-as-one in the formation of consistent multiplicities is to be understood. I confess that for me this is a central question with respect to Badiou’s ontology that I feel has received scanttreatment.
TRYING TO MOVE BEYOND ANTHROPOCENTRISM: SOME THOUGHTS IN Daniel’s critique of my claims about epistemology in the first chapter of The Democracy of Objects is particularly valuable, because it helps me to clarify my own aims better. The first chapter is designed to accomplish three things: 1) provide grounds for why we are entitled to speak of entities independent of humans (anepistemological
LATOUR’S PRINCIPLE OF IRREDUCTION As I read it, Latour’s principle of irreduction actually has four parts – well, three plus a clarification. People tend to fixate on the first part and miss the rest. Here it is in full: “1.1.1 Nothing is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything else. DIFFERENCE IN ITSELF Difference is the state in which one can speak of determination as such. The difference ‘between’ two things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However, instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself– and yet that from which it distinguishes A BRIEF REMARK ON ACTANTS All that is to be attended to in the concept of actants is the manner in which they modify the action of other entities. Here are a few examples of actants: * Vinegar poured on baking soda. In its encounter with vinegar the baking soda behaves in ways that it would not otherwise behave. * A surprising result in a laboratory experiment. BHASKAR AGAIN: THE REAL, THE ACTUAL, AND THE EMPIRICAL November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm. Dan, So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m stillreading it
SIMONDON AND INDIVIDUATION Now that my summer session classes are over, I've finally been able to sit down and begin reading Gilbert Simondon's L'individuation: à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information, which is a combined reprint of his earlier works L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique and L'individuation psychique et collective. Readers familiar with Deleuze's Difference and OF QUASI-OBJECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVES June 19, 2011 at 10:36 am. Thank you for a very insightful post! I believe that the Latourian amodernism is the most important contribution to thinking the role of the social sciences anew. However, Latour himself has mostly been concerned with the issue of hybrids (or quasi-objects) in the natural sciences (such as microbes). SPECULATIVE REALISM, THE COMMONS, AND POLITICS Speculative Realism, the Commons, and Politics. Over at This Cage is Worms Cameron has a nice post responding to my recent post on ontology and politics and articulating his own meditations on the political within a speculative realist framework. I truly wish that I had a better answer to the question of the political, but there are a coupleof
NARCISSISM | LARVAL SUBJECTS A brief post before dinner for thoughts that need to be developed in greater detail. In an interview somewhere or other I vaguely remember that Derrida says that his project, from beginning to end, is an interrogation and deconstruction of narcissism. Given Derrida's profound critique of the logic of identity, this comes as no surprise, BADIOU’S COUNT-AS-ONE Badiou’s Count-as-One. Dominic has written a very nice post entitled “Who’s Counting?”, on how, precisely, Badiou’s operation of the count-as-one in the formation of consistent multiplicities is to be understood. I confess that for me this is a central question with respect to Badiou’s ontology that I feel has received scanttreatment.
TRYING TO MOVE BEYOND ANTHROPOCENTRISM: SOME THOUGHTS IN Daniel’s critique of my claims about epistemology in the first chapter of The Democracy of Objects is particularly valuable, because it helps me to clarify my own aims better. The first chapter is designed to accomplish three things: 1) provide grounds for why we are entitled to speak of entities independent of humans (anepistemological
LATOUR’S PRINCIPLE OF IRREDUCTION As I read it, Latour’s principle of irreduction actually has four parts – well, three plus a clarification. People tend to fixate on the first part and miss the rest. Here it is in full: “1.1.1 Nothing is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything else. DIFFERENCE IN ITSELF Difference is the state in which one can speak of determination as such. The difference ‘between’ two things is only empirical, and the corresponding determinations are only extrinsic. However, instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself– and yet that from which it distinguishes A BRIEF REMARK ON ACTANTS All that is to be attended to in the concept of actants is the manner in which they modify the action of other entities. Here are a few examples of actants: * Vinegar poured on baking soda. In its encounter with vinegar the baking soda behaves in ways that it would not otherwise behave. * A surprising result in a laboratory experiment. BHASKAR AGAIN: THE REAL, THE ACTUAL, AND THE EMPIRICAL November 23, 2009 at 6:57 pm. Dan, So far I emphasize Bhaskar’s earlier works such as A Realist Theory of Science and Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation.I find the later works largely impenetrable. I can’t really speak to Grant’s work as I’m stillreading it
SIMONDON AND INDIVIDUATION Now that my summer session classes are over, I've finally been able to sit down and begin reading Gilbert Simondon's L'individuation: à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information, which is a combined reprint of his earlier works L'individu et sa genèse physico-biologique and L'individuation psychique et collective. Readers familiar with Deleuze's Difference and OF QUASI-OBJECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVES June 19, 2011 at 10:36 am. Thank you for a very insightful post! I believe that the Latourian amodernism is the most important contribution to thinking the role of the social sciences anew. However, Latour himself has mostly been concerned with the issue of hybrids (or quasi-objects) in the natural sciences (such as microbes). SPECULATIVE REALISM, THE COMMONS, AND POLITICS Speculative Realism, the Commons, and Politics. Over at This Cage is Worms Cameron has a nice post responding to my recent post on ontology and politics and articulating his own meditations on the political within a speculative realist framework. I truly wish that I had a better answer to the question of the political, but there are a coupleof
LOVE | LARVAL SUBJECTS Disjunctive love is a love that somehow occurs in divergent worlds that nonetheless occupy the same earth. read on! Here, to fall in love is to fall in love with a world that one cannot assimilate, consume, or domesticate. This is queer love. In disjunctive love the lovers are withdrawn from one another as worlds, yet still somehow in relation. OF QUASI-OBJECTS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF COLLECTIVES June 19, 2011 at 10:36 am. Thank you for a very insightful post! I believe that the Latourian amodernism is the most important contribution to thinking the role of the social sciences anew. However, Latour himself has mostly been concerned with the issue of hybrids (or quasi-objects) in the natural sciences (such as microbes). A BRIEF REMARK ON ACTANTS All that is to be attended to in the concept of actants is the manner in which they modify the action of other entities. Here are a few examples of actants: * Vinegar poured on baking soda. In its encounter with vinegar the baking soda behaves in ways that it would not otherwise behave. * A surprising result in a laboratory experiment. ONTICOLOGY– A MANIFESTO FOR OBJECT-ORIENTED ONTOLOGY PART This alternative first requires a fourth blow to human narcissism, where man is dethroned from his position of centrality in the order of being and situated in his proper place as one being among others, no more or less important than these others. manifesto for ObjectOriented Ontology
STIEGLER, SIMONDON, AND HYPEROBJECTS: NON-ANTHROPOCENTRIC Earlier I discussed the possibility of technical fields as hyperobjects. Later in the first chapter of Technics and Time, Stiegler discusses the non-anthropomorphic dimension of technology as outlined by Simondon. Once again, my aim here is not so much to outline the nature of technology, but to unfold the nature of hyperobjects. As Stiegler writes, CORRELATIONISM AND THE FATE OF PHILOSOPHY Correlationism and the Fate of Philosophy. Posted by larvalsubjects under Critique, Doxa, Enlightenment, Epistemology, Grounds, Materialism, Real, Truth. Comments. There are works of philosophy and theory that help clarify the thought of a particular philosopher or a particular concept without unsettling our presuppositions aboutthe
OVERRATED PHILOSOPHERS February 26, 2010 at 2:25 am. Probably the wrong crowd to mesh with your perspective, but I found it interesting that in a poll of mainly Anglophone philosophers, Wittgenstein was the only 20th-century figure to make the “top 20 of all time” list at all, and therefore it seems the only candidate for being overrated (by them).. I think you’re right on Russell not being generally CONCEPTUAL PERSONAE: PHILOSOPHER, ANTI-PHILOSOPHER It is a set of norms governing how concepts are to be operated on. Philosophy is inhabited by three main conceptual personae, but there are others as well. There is first the conceptual personae of the philosopher. Here it’s important to proceed with caution, for all three conceptual personae are referred to as philosophers in ordinaryEnglish.
SOME REMARKS ON LATOUR, MEREOLOGY, AND ACTANTS May 14, 2010 at 8:16 pm. I’m a bit in a hurry here in defense of Latour’s ANT position: the approach is made for taking seriously the entangling moves in assemblages that have humans in them. it allows a kind of ethnography or at least to take serious humans-among-others with their practical metaphysics. to go in and a priori have a conception of what THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HISTORY OF ONTOLOGY For Heidegger, the aim of this destruction of the history of ontology is to make the fundamental structures of this tradition explicit. If there is a problem in them remaining implicit, then this is because “ hen tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that what it ‘transmits’ is made so inaccessible, proximally andfor
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October 28, 2019
SHELTER: BETWEEN THING AND THOUGHT-THING Posted by larvalsubjects under UncategorizedComments
Russian POW Camp Oven, Svaerholt, Norway. Picture by Levi Bryant,August 2018
On Thursday I found myself sitting in my office with a very bright student who is now taking his second course with me. He sat down and looked at me very intensely and said “I have some questions for you”. I was, of course, immediately nervous. There, in his hands, I saw a very marked up copy of my Poland talk, “DomesticObjects/Wild Things
”
(one class had expressed interest in the talk so I made it available to them). I was, of course, flattered that he had taken the time to read it, and chuckled a bit at the irony of my talk being covered with red ink. “Professor Bryant”, he said, “throughout your talk you’re very critical of philosophy and how it converts the thing into the thought-thing or replaces the thing with the thought-thing. But isn’t the conversion of the thing into the thought-thing a good thing? Isn’t that how we know things? If we can’t convert the thing into the thought-thing, doesn’t that entail the ruin of philosophy and science?” Fishing Village Beach, Svaerholt Norway. Picture by Levi Bryant,August 2018
This is a really great question and criticism and I’m not at all sure how to respond to it. This is a very difficult point to articulate because I am essentially trying to indicate or allude to something that is outside of language, even if it is entangled in language all sorts of ways. When I make the claim that the cardinal sin of philosophy (and many other forms of theory besides) consists in converting the thing– in its materiality –into the thought-thing, I am trying to articulate the way in which the thing is replaced by the signifier. Any attempt to explain this is necessarily doomed to failure. It simply cannot be done because I am attempting to point at something that is outside of discourse, outside of language, outside of conceptuality; yet, in the very act of doing this, I bring thing the thing into language, discourse, and conceptuality. Hegel articulated the point brilliantly in the sense-certainty section of the _Phenomenology_. There he points out that in the shape of consciousness he calls “sense-certainty”, we _mean_ this singular thing here, yet we find that we can only _say_ the universal or general. I _want_ to indicate this irreplaceable, Stickley mid-century, side-table that my wife inherited from her grandmother, but the moment I say “side-table” I have evoked a _general_ term that applies– in the order of language –to _all_ side-tables. No matter how much I attempt to enrich my description by multiplying adjectives, I still find myself caught in the order of generality. Hegel thus concludes that language is more true than what we _mean_ or _intend_. Since, no matter how hard we try, we cannot _say_ the singular, the truth of the singular, he argues, is in fact the universal. We can _replace_ the singular with the universal and get on with it. It’s a brilliant argument and one that I wish to avoid as much as possible.read on!
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October 28, 2019
DIFFERENTIALITY AND ECOLOGY Posted by larvalsubjects under UncategorizedLeave a Comment
A leitmotif of Lacan’s earlier seminars was the claim that all communication is miscommunication. This thesis was so important to him that he made it a fundamental principle of psychoanalytic practice in the clinic. We must, above all, resist the urge to understand our analysands, he would say. We must resist the belief that we understand our patients. Lacan, I think, did not say this out of a desire to be contrarian or paradoxical. Rather, it was premised on fundamental insights arising out of his engagement with structural linguistics. Recall that a fundamental Lacanian thesis is that the unconscious is structured like a language. Although he is careful to emphasize that the unconscious is structured _like_ a language, his claim nonetheless is premised in part on the thesis that the elements that compose the unconscious are characterized by differentiality. They do not intrinsically possess the signification they have, but rather take on their meaning as a function of their differences from other terms. Consider the following example: In American English, rivers and streams are distinguished by their size. A river is larger than a stream. In French– and I am not a fluent French speaker, so I might be getting this wrong, but it’s the principle that’s important, i.e., other examples could be found to illustrate the point –we might think that translatability between one language and another is a simple matter. We might think that rivers are to _rivières_ as streams are to _fleuves. _Yet this is not how the French language “cuts up” reality. In French a _fleuve_ is a body of water that flows into the ocean, while a _rivière_ is a body of water that flows into either a _fleuve _or another _rivière_. There’s a sense in which we still speak our native language even when we learn to speak another language because we carry the differential system of our mOther tongue over into the new native language. We can therefore imagine the following scenario: we have an American visiting France who does not, of course, speak the French language because he’s a vulgar American, and we have a Frenchman who speaks English but who still speaks French through English (he uses the French system of differentiality when speaking English without realizing it). Our vulgar American asks him for directions to the historical church a couple miles a way. The Frenchman responds by telling him to go down the road a ways and take a right at the _river_ before the bridge. The American, of course, is expecting a large body of flowing water. Instead he comes across a small body with a bridge across it. For this reason, rather than taking a right before the bridge, he continues across the bridge expecting to eventually encounter a large body of flowing water with a bridge across it. The different systems of differentiality belonging to both language have generated miscommunication between these two people.read on!
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October 25, 2019
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION Posted by larvalsubjects under UncategorizedComments
This semester I’ve had the tremendous pleasure of teaching a 2000 level course devoted to philosophy of religion. Following the last time I taught this course four or five years ago, I had chosen not to teach this course because I simply couldn’t find an edited collection that I felt comfortable teaching. Everything I came across was like Peterson’s _Philosophy of Religion. _Follow
the link and read the table of contents. The problem quickly becomes evident. First, with the exception of a couple of readings devoted to Buddhism, the readings are almost entirely to variants of theism and monotheism in particular. It’s not that such readings are inappropriate for a philosophy of religion course, but rather that the term “religion” is much _broader_ than theism, questions of whether or not god exists, whether or not it is rational to believe in god, what god’s nature might be, and why it might be rational to believe in god. I believe that this is a true scandal. How can I responsibly stand in front of my class, populated by students who are from all over the world and who come from a variety of religious practices, and teach material that is almost _exclusively_ devoted to the rationality of belief in god? Second, these sorts of collections are almost entirely devoted to _doctrine_ and, in particular, doctrine as it is articulated by the highly educated elite of a religion. Again, it is not that teaching Kierkegaard, Lewis, Platinga, or Jean-Luc Marion is inappropriate in a philosophy of religion, but rather that 1) well articulated theologies are often quite at odds with popular belief among the lay, 2) not all religions have a strong tradition of apologetics, and 3) belief and doctrine do not exhaust religious phenomena. In Peterson’s collection of writings, for example, there is no discussion of ritual and ceremony, yet ritual and ceremony are often at the core of religion. How can we call something “philosophy of religion” without deeply and seriously thinking of the nature of ritual, why peoples engage in rituals, and how rituals might be a form of thinking? Even in those religions that are doctrine heavy like Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, we can imagine students taking such a course and finding their religion completely unrecognizable given the materials that aretaught.
Suppose we begin with a presupposition: every discipline has a sort of regional ontology that pre-delineates the objects that it investigates. Often the basic concepts of that discipline are largely unconscious and are merely assumed. Thus, for example, prior to making any observations of society and social phenomena, sociology must nonetheless have a _concept_ of what society _is_ that guide its inquiry and investigations. Likewise, literary studies must have a basic concept of what literature _is_ that determines what texts it will investigate, what is literary about them, and what texts it ignores. While it is not outside of the realm of possibility, we would be surprised to discover a literature course or article devoted to directions that accompany appliance. It is likely that journalistic articles are treated as falling outside of literature. When there are heated controversies surrounding courses in literature departments devoted to comic books or popular consumption novels, this is because those who oppose the teaching of these things are working with a particular concept of literature or the ontology of literature. They have a concept of what the _being _of a literary object is. These concepts are often unconscious. It seems to me that this should be one of the central topics of philosophy of religion. If philosophy of religion is truly philosophy _of_ religion, it should first and foremost be a reflexive analysis of our concept of religion. Rather than a focus on questions of whether or not god exists, whether it is rational to believe in god, what the divine nature might be, etc., the first and foremost question of philosophy of religion should be what is religion? Just as we might engage in philosophical reflection as to what constitutes the literary prior to any investigation of a work of literature, we should first engage in a reflexive analysis of what we mean by religion, prior to the investigation of any religion. What is it that falls into the basket of religion and what, if anything, is outside of that basket. What distinguishes the religious from the non-religious? It was in this connection that I was delighted to discover Kevin Schilbrack’s book _Philosophy and the Study ofReligions
_.
Schilbrack’s book asks all of the questions I was looking for years ago when I first taught this course and puts its finger on why I felt so frustrated with edited collections like Peterson’s. Rather than a text almost devoted entirely to the rationality of belief in god, it explores questions on the nature of ritual and how ritual and religious practices are forms of thinking. It has another chapter devoted to the nature of belief and different theories of belief and the role they play in our behavior and action. There are yet other chapters devoted to the ontology of religion, the manner in which the concept of religion has a history and the way it can function to include or exclude. This, I think, is precisely the way in which philosophy of religion should be taught. If there is a merit in such an approach, then this is because it leads students to reflect on their own unconscious assumptions about the nature of religion– whether they are believers are not –and how these inform their actions and their evaluations of other religions. That, in it itself, is worth its weight in gold.October 21, 2019
DOMESTIC OBJECTS/WILD THINGS: ALETHEIA, RUINATION, AND DRIFT Posted by larvalsubjects under UncategorizedLeave a Comment
Some people have
expressed interest in my keynote address for the Rethinking Agency conference in Poznan, Poland. Here it is: bryantpolandpdfwildthings.
It hasn’t been edited and doesn’t include references, so be gentle! The talk was well received and generated a lot of discussion. The conference as a whole was amazing. Perhaps I’ll write about it in days to come as my thoughts crystalize more. The great Bjørnar Olsen criticized the talk on the ground that my rhetoric suggests a normative language in which wild things are the good and positive and domestic objects are bad and negative. This was certainly not my intention as I hope the examples I chose– cracking home foundations, roots destroying plumbing systems, etc., attest. Nonetheless, I think he’s right that I need to tone down the rhetoric. I think this problem can be solved by conceiving things as dipolar entities that have two dimensions: one tending towards the domestic and the other the wild. This would be somewhat like my distinction between local manifestations and virtual proper being in _The Democracy of Objects_ and _Onto-Cartography_. Stein Farstadvoll’s questions and remarks helped me to think of this as well (and he gave a truly amazing talk at the conference). He asked whether or not there are nonhuman processes of domestication. I think the answer is an emphatic yes! I immediately thought of ant and termite nests and how they build their own environments, as well as the way in which trees change the chemistry of their soil in forests to create favorable growing conditions. I would also like to come up with inorganic and mineral examples of these processes of domestication, such as, perhaps, the way in which wind carves stone creating their own weather conditions. Stein, I think, did a far better job exploring the wildness of things with his archaeological investigations of birds, aluminum, and certain insects.October 21, 2019
BEWILDERNESS
Posted by larvalsubjects under UncategorizedLeave a Comment
Apart from being great art and a fascinating article, this article deserves to be shared simply because of Julian Hatton’s word “bewilderness”. I’m stealing that, for sure.October 21, 2019
CYBORG AGENCY
Posted by larvalsubjects under UncategorizedLeave a Comment
Let us begin with Philippa Foot’s infamous trolley problem. In the scenario, we are on a runaway trolley that cannot be stopped. Further along the way there are five people tied to the track. There is another track that turns off to the left, where a single person is tied down. Your sole power over the trolley is the ability to choose which track the trolley will go down. Modern moral theory– especially of the analytic and Anglo-American variety –is filled with dreary and sadistic thought experiments like this. Foot’s thought experiment stages a confrontation between Kantian deontological ethics and utilitarianism. On the one hand, Kantian moral theory tells us to always treat people as ends in themselves and never as means to an end. Yet in this scenario, we have no choice but to treat a person as a means to an end. We must sacrifice a life to save other lives. When Mill tells us that utilitarianism determines our moral duties by calculating that action that will produce the greatest amount of happiness– in both quality and quantity –for the greatest number of people we find, in this scenario, a situation where we must kill one person to save five. It is dangerous to write about the trolley problem because so much has been written on it. It has even made it into popular television shows like _The Good Place_. You could probably easily fill a small library with articles exploring the various possible permutations of the thought experiment. Does it matter whether the single person on the tracks is your child or a Hitler-like villain, or someone suffering from a terminal illness, for example? Does it matter whether the five people are morally reprehensible? Alternatively, we could say that the trolley problem is responsible for the destruction of a significant portion of the Brazilian rain forests. Perhaps we learn something from all of these discussions, though following Isabelle principles regarding what constitutes a good experiment– the capacity to surprise and disrupt our _doxa _or commonplace assumptions, I’m skeptical. However, if the trolley problem teaches us something of interest, I think this lies not in what it tells us about the nature of moral reasoning and normative principles by which we make normative judgments, but rather in what it suggests, perhaps, about the nature of _agency_. I’m sure someone has written about this somewhere– one could probably devote their entire life to scholarship in philosophy and psychology on the trolley problem –but unfortunately I just don’t have the time to delve that deeply into the literature. So I will crudely stumble about with my hot take on the trolley problem, knowing that I am woefully ignorant of the literature. I’m sure someone will come along telling me to read this or that article that I don’t have access to electronically or through my library system that articulates exactly what I say in which follows.(more…)
August 25, 2018
MATERIAL TIME
Posted by larvalsubjects under Uncategorized1 Comment
Stone Age House on isthmus in Svaerholt, Norway. Photo By Levi Bryant I’m slowly walking along the isthmus in Svaerholt, Norway. My legs are tired from climbing hills and mountains and I can’t move any faster through the grass and uneven terrain. Earlier in the day I helped Esther, Ingar, and Stein dig a midden outside of the ruins of the Nazi officer quarters in the village. We discover piles of fish bones, whale or reindeer bones, lots of fishing hooks and nails, and shards of porcelain and glass. There are Nazi eagles stamped on the porcelain. Despite being shattered, it looks brand new. Despite the discomfort of laboring over middens, carefully peeling away layers of dirt with a trowel, archaeologists have the best job, I think to myself. Everything they find is treasure, even cod bones and mysteriously bent, rusted nails.read on!
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