PROFESSOR PETER T. LEESONCONTACTPAPERSPRESS Peter T. Leeson is the Duncan Black Professor of Economics and Law at George Mason University EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 conditions. Members of this subpopulation face an elevated risk of death if they become infected with COVID.4 For that reason many such people “locked themselves down” soon after COVID emerged. The cost they incur by doing so does not vary appreciably with the prevalence CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONS 3 with one another. Criminals cannot rely on government to create or enforce laws governing their activities or interactions. 3 Further, criminal organizations may find it difficult to secure cooperation among their members because their members are criminals.

WITCH TRIALS*

significantly, the former did not in general serve competitive ends by executing witch-prosecutors’ confessional rivals.5 Stalin’s show trials, in contrast, had the annihilation of his political opponents as one of their primary purposes and in this sense were

closer

THINK TANKS

Think Tanks* Peter T. Leeson† Matt E. Ryan‡ Claudia R. Williamson§ Abstract This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between think tanks and economic GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 THE NEW COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY The Review of Austrian Economics, 18:3/4, 281–304, 2005. c 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands. The New Comparative Political Economy PETER J. BOETTKE pboettke@gmu.edu Department of Economics, MSN 3G4, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 AN-ARRGH-CHY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PIRATE ORGANIZATION law and economics of pirate organization 1053 timony of pirates themselves, form an important part of the historical record this article relies on.7 Finally, a few pirate captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734), whose captors ultimately released them, published THE DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation Peter T. Leeson George Mason University Andrea M. Dean West Virginia University According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and “infect” A NOTE ON THE MARKET PROVISION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE The Journal of Private Enterprise 29(2), 2014, 51–55 51 A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense Peter T. Leeson George Mason

University

PROFESSOR PETER T. LEESONCONTACTPAPERSPRESS Peter T. Leeson is the Duncan Black Professor of Economics and Law at George Mason University EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 conditions. Members of this subpopulation face an elevated risk of death if they become infected with COVID.4 For that reason many such people “locked themselves down” soon after COVID emerged. The cost they incur by doing so does not vary appreciably with the prevalence CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONS 3 with one another. Criminals cannot rely on government to create or enforce laws governing their activities or interactions. 3 Further, criminal organizations may find it difficult to secure cooperation among their members because their members are criminals.

WITCH TRIALS*

significantly, the former did not in general serve competitive ends by executing witch-prosecutors’ confessional rivals.5 Stalin’s show trials, in contrast, had the annihilation of his political opponents as one of their primary purposes and in this sense were

closer

THINK TANKS

Think Tanks* Peter T. Leeson† Matt E. Ryan‡ Claudia R. Williamson§ Abstract This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between think tanks and economic GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 THE NEW COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY The Review of Austrian Economics, 18:3/4, 281–304, 2005. c 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands. The New Comparative Political Economy PETER J. BOETTKE pboettke@gmu.edu Department of Economics, MSN 3G4, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 AN-ARRGH-CHY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PIRATE ORGANIZATION law and economics of pirate organization 1053 timony of pirates themselves, form an important part of the historical record this article relies on.7 Finally, a few pirate captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734), whose captors ultimately released them, published THE DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation Peter T. Leeson George Mason University Andrea M. Dean West Virginia University According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and “infect” A NOTE ON THE MARKET PROVISION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE The Journal of Private Enterprise 29(2), 2014, 51–55 51 A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense Peter T. Leeson George Mason

University

EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 typically considered insignificant. And compared to the on-site externality of your exposure to the gentleman's smoke, they are. In many classical externality GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 ORDEALS - PETER LEESON Ordeals 693 crimes of which they were accused.4 My analysis uses rational choice theory to show how ordeals did just that. In doing so, I develop a law and economics of superstition. The law and economics of superstition explores the role that ob-

TRIAL BY BATTLE

The vanquished lost his cause and, if he were unlucky, his life. People called these combats trials by battle.2 2 To modern observers trial by battle is an icon of medieval backwardness. Montesquieu called it ‘‘monstrous’’ (1748 : 563).

PETER T. LEESON

2009] The Invisible Hook 141 Nobel Prize–winning economist Gary Becker was the first to ap-ply the logic of rational-choice decision making to criminals.2 Follow- ing him, a number of other scholars extended this logic to decision EARW(H)IG: I CAN’T HEAR YOU BECAUSE YOUR IDEAS ARE OLD 532 Boettke et al. theorists to be resurrected, but the subsequent professional and public debate has not resulted in the ‘Minsky moment’ becoming the main explanation for the crisis.1 Instead, John Maynard Keynes has captured the moment (see, e.g., Skidelsky, 2009) THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMICS: WHERE WE ARE AND HOW WE GOT HERE Peter J. Boettke and Peter T. Leeson are professors in the department of economics at George Mason University. Daniel J. Smith is a graduate research assistant, also in the department of economics at George

Mason University.

THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES Christopher J. Coyne and Peter T. Leeson The question of the wealth of nations has been at the center of economics for more than two centuries. BETTER OFF STATELESS: SOMALIA BEFORE AND AFTER GOVERNMENT 690 P.T. Leeson / Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (2007) 689–710 ppression by the governmenthas so much more baneful an effect on the springs of national prosperity, than almost any degree of lawlessness and turbulence under free institu-tions. Nations have acquired some wealth, and made some progress in improvement in states HATE GROUPS AND HATE CRIME 1 Hate Groups and Hate Crime* Matt E. Ryan† Peter T. Leeson‡ Abstract This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between hate groups and hate crime empirically. PROFESSOR PETER T. LEESONCONTACTPAPERSPRESS Peter T. Leeson is the Duncan Black Professor of Economics and Law at George Mason University EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 conditions. Members of this subpopulation face an elevated risk of death if they become infected with COVID.4 For that reason many such people “locked themselves down” soon after COVID emerged. The cost they incur by doing so does not vary appreciably with the prevalence CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONS 3 with one another. Criminals cannot rely on government to create or enforce laws governing their activities or interactions. 3 Further, criminal organizations may find it difficult to secure cooperation among their members because their members are criminals.

WITCH TRIALS*

significantly, the former did not in general serve competitive ends by executing witch-prosecutors’ confessional rivals.5 Stalin’s show trials, in contrast, had the annihilation of his political opponents as one of their primary purposes and in this sense were

closer

THINK TANKS

Think Tanks* Peter T. Leeson† Matt E. Ryan‡ Claudia R. Williamson§ Abstract This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between think tanks and economic GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 THE NEW COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY The Review of Austrian Economics, 18:3/4, 281–304, 2005. c 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands. The New Comparative Political Economy PETER J. BOETTKE pboettke@gmu.edu Department of Economics, MSN 3G4, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 AN-ARRGH-CHY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PIRATE ORGANIZATION law and economics of pirate organization 1053 timony of pirates themselves, form an important part of the historical record this article relies on.7 Finally, a few pirate captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734), whose captors ultimately released them, published THE DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation Peter T. Leeson George Mason University Andrea M. Dean West Virginia University According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and “infect” A NOTE ON THE MARKET PROVISION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE The Journal of Private Enterprise 29(2), 2014, 51–55 51 A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense Peter T. Leeson George Mason

University

PROFESSOR PETER T. LEESONCONTACTPAPERSPRESS Peter T. Leeson is the Duncan Black Professor of Economics and Law at George Mason University EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 conditions. Members of this subpopulation face an elevated risk of death if they become infected with COVID.4 For that reason many such people “locked themselves down” soon after COVID emerged. The cost they incur by doing so does not vary appreciably with the prevalence CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONS 3 with one another. Criminals cannot rely on government to create or enforce laws governing their activities or interactions. 3 Further, criminal organizations may find it difficult to secure cooperation among their members because their members are criminals.

WITCH TRIALS*

significantly, the former did not in general serve competitive ends by executing witch-prosecutors’ confessional rivals.5 Stalin’s show trials, in contrast, had the annihilation of his political opponents as one of their primary purposes and in this sense were

closer

THINK TANKS

Think Tanks* Peter T. Leeson† Matt E. Ryan‡ Claudia R. Williamson§ Abstract This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between think tanks and economic GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 THE NEW COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY The Review of Austrian Economics, 18:3/4, 281–304, 2005. c 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands. The New Comparative Political Economy PETER J. BOETTKE pboettke@gmu.edu Department of Economics, MSN 3G4, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 AN-ARRGH-CHY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PIRATE ORGANIZATION law and economics of pirate organization 1053 timony of pirates themselves, form an important part of the historical record this article relies on.7 Finally, a few pirate captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734), whose captors ultimately released them, published THE DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation Peter T. Leeson George Mason University Andrea M. Dean West Virginia University According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and “infect” A NOTE ON THE MARKET PROVISION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE The Journal of Private Enterprise 29(2), 2014, 51–55 51 A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense Peter T. Leeson George Mason

University

EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 typically considered insignificant. And compared to the on-site externality of your exposure to the gentleman's smoke, they are. In many classical externality GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 ORDEALS - PETER LEESON Ordeals 693 crimes of which they were accused.4 My analysis uses rational choice theory to show how ordeals did just that. In doing so, I develop a law and economics of superstition. The law and economics of superstition explores the role that ob-

TRIAL BY BATTLE

The vanquished lost his cause and, if he were unlucky, his life. People called these combats trials by battle.2 2 To modern observers trial by battle is an icon of medieval backwardness. Montesquieu called it ‘‘monstrous’’ (1748 : 563).

PETER T. LEESON

2009] The Invisible Hook 141 Nobel Prize–winning economist Gary Becker was the first to ap-ply the logic of rational-choice decision making to criminals.2 Follow- ing him, a number of other scholars extended this logic to decision EARW(H)IG: I CAN’T HEAR YOU BECAUSE YOUR IDEAS ARE OLD 532 Boettke et al. theorists to be resurrected, but the subsequent professional and public debate has not resulted in the ‘Minsky moment’ becoming the main explanation for the crisis.1 Instead, John Maynard Keynes has captured the moment (see, e.g., Skidelsky, 2009) THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMICS: WHERE WE ARE AND HOW WE GOT HERE Peter J. Boettke and Peter T. Leeson are professors in the department of economics at George Mason University. Daniel J. Smith is a graduate research assistant, also in the department of economics at George

Mason University.

THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES Christopher J. Coyne and Peter T. Leeson The question of the wealth of nations has been at the center of economics for more than two centuries. BETTER OFF STATELESS: SOMALIA BEFORE AND AFTER GOVERNMENT 690 P.T. Leeson / Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (2007) 689–710 ppression by the governmenthas so much more baneful an effect on the springs of national prosperity, than almost any degree of lawlessness and turbulence under free institu-tions. Nations have acquired some wealth, and made some progress in improvement in states HATE GROUPS AND HATE CRIME 1 Hate Groups and Hate Crime* Matt E. Ryan† Peter T. Leeson‡ Abstract This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between hate groups and hate crime empirically. PROFESSOR PETER T. LEESONCONTACTPAPERSPRESS Peter T. Leeson is the Duncan Black Professor of Economics and Law at George Mason University EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 conditions. Members of this subpopulation face an elevated risk of death if they become infected with COVID.4 For that reason many such people “locked themselves down” soon after COVID emerged. The cost they incur by doing so does not vary appreciably with the prevalence CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONS 3 with one another. Criminals cannot rely on government to create or enforce laws governing their activities or interactions. 3 Further, criminal organizations may find it difficult to secure cooperation among their members because their members are criminals.

WITCH TRIALS*

significantly, the former did not in general serve competitive ends by executing witch-prosecutors’ confessional rivals.5 Stalin’s show trials, in contrast, had the annihilation of his political opponents as one of their primary purposes and in this sense were

closer

THINK TANKS

Think Tanks* Peter T. Leeson† Matt E. Ryan‡ Claudia R. Williamson§ Abstract This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between think tanks and economic GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 THE NEW COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY The Review of Austrian Economics, 18:3/4, 281–304, 2005. c 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands. The New Comparative Political Economy PETER J. BOETTKE pboettke@gmu.edu Department of Economics, MSN 3G4, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 AN-ARRGH-CHY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PIRATE ORGANIZATION law and economics of pirate organization 1053 timony of pirates themselves, form an important part of the historical record this article relies on.7 Finally, a few pirate captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734), whose captors ultimately released them, published THE DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation Peter T. Leeson George Mason University Andrea M. Dean West Virginia University According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and “infect” A NOTE ON THE MARKET PROVISION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE The Journal of Private Enterprise 29(2), 2014, 51–55 51 A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense Peter T. Leeson George Mason

University

PROFESSOR PETER T. LEESONCONTACTPAPERSPRESS Peter T. Leeson is the Duncan Black Professor of Economics and Law at George Mason University EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 conditions. Members of this subpopulation face an elevated risk of death if they become infected with COVID.4 For that reason many such people “locked themselves down” soon after COVID emerged. The cost they incur by doing so does not vary appreciably with the prevalence CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONS 3 with one another. Criminals cannot rely on government to create or enforce laws governing their activities or interactions. 3 Further, criminal organizations may find it difficult to secure cooperation among their members because their members are criminals.

WITCH TRIALS*

significantly, the former did not in general serve competitive ends by executing witch-prosecutors’ confessional rivals.5 Stalin’s show trials, in contrast, had the annihilation of his political opponents as one of their primary purposes and in this sense were

closer

THINK TANKS

Think Tanks* Peter T. Leeson† Matt E. Ryan‡ Claudia R. Williamson§ Abstract This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between think tanks and economic GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 THE NEW COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY The Review of Austrian Economics, 18:3/4, 281–304, 2005. c 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands. The New Comparative Political Economy PETER J. BOETTKE pboettke@gmu.edu Department of Economics, MSN 3G4, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 AN-ARRGH-CHY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PIRATE ORGANIZATION law and economics of pirate organization 1053 timony of pirates themselves, form an important part of the historical record this article relies on.7 Finally, a few pirate captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734), whose captors ultimately released them, published THE DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation Peter T. Leeson George Mason University Andrea M. Dean West Virginia University According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and “infect” A NOTE ON THE MARKET PROVISION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE The Journal of Private Enterprise 29(2), 2014, 51–55 51 A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense Peter T. Leeson George Mason

University

EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 typically considered insignificant. And compared to the on-site externality of your exposure to the gentleman's smoke, they are. In many classical externality GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 ORDEALS - PETER LEESON Ordeals 693 crimes of which they were accused.4 My analysis uses rational choice theory to show how ordeals did just that. In doing so, I develop a law and economics of superstition. The law and economics of superstition explores the role that ob-

TRIAL BY BATTLE

The vanquished lost his cause and, if he were unlucky, his life. People called these combats trials by battle.2 2 To modern observers trial by battle is an icon of medieval backwardness. Montesquieu called it ‘‘monstrous’’ (1748 : 563).

PETER T. LEESON

2009] The Invisible Hook 141 Nobel Prize–winning economist Gary Becker was the first to ap-ply the logic of rational-choice decision making to criminals.2 Follow- ing him, a number of other scholars extended this logic to decision EARW(H)IG: I CAN’T HEAR YOU BECAUSE YOUR IDEAS ARE OLD 532 Boettke et al. theorists to be resurrected, but the subsequent professional and public debate has not resulted in the ‘Minsky moment’ becoming the main explanation for the crisis.1 Instead, John Maynard Keynes has captured the moment (see, e.g., Skidelsky, 2009) THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMICS: WHERE WE ARE AND HOW WE GOT HERE Peter J. Boettke and Peter T. Leeson are professors in the department of economics at George Mason University. Daniel J. Smith is a graduate research assistant, also in the department of economics at George

Mason University.

THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES Christopher J. Coyne and Peter T. Leeson The question of the wealth of nations has been at the center of economics for more than two centuries. BETTER OFF STATELESS: SOMALIA BEFORE AND AFTER GOVERNMENT 690 P.T. Leeson / Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (2007) 689–710 ppression by the governmenthas so much more baneful an effect on the springs of national prosperity, than almost any degree of lawlessness and turbulence under free institu-tions. Nations have acquired some wealth, and made some progress in improvement in states HATE GROUPS AND HATE CRIME 1 Hate Groups and Hate Crime* Matt E. Ryan† Peter T. Leeson‡ Abstract This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between hate groups and hate crime empirically. PROFESSOR PETER T. LEESONCONTACTPAPERSPRESS Peter T. Leeson is the Duncan Black Professor of Economics and Law at George Mason University EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 conditions. Members of this subpopulation face an elevated risk of death if they become infected with COVID.4 For that reason many such people “locked themselves down” soon after COVID emerged. The cost they incur by doing so does not vary appreciably with the prevalence

WITCH TRIALS*

significantly, the former did not in general serve competitive ends by executing witch-prosecutors’ confessional rivals.5 Stalin’s show trials, in contrast, had the annihilation of his political opponents as one of their primary purposes and in this sense were

closer

AN-ARRGH-CHY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PIRATE ORGANIZATIONCREW OF A PIRATE SHIPMEMBERS OF A PIRATE CREWPIRATE JOBSDEFINITION OF ARGH PIRATE TALKPIRATE ORGANIZATION NAMES law and economics of pirate organization 1053 timony of pirates themselves, form an important part of the historical record this article relies on.7 Finally, a few pirate captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734), whose captors ultimately released them, published ORDEALS - PETER LEESON Ordeals 693 crimes of which they were accused.4 My analysis uses rational choice theory to show how ordeals did just that. In doing so, I develop a law and economics of superstition. The law and economics of superstition explores the role that ob- GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 THE NEW COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY The Review of Austrian Economics, 18:3/4, 281–304, 2005. c 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands. The New Comparative Political Economy PETER J. BOETTKE pboettke@gmu.edu Department of Economics, MSN 3G4, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES Christopher J. Coyne and Peter T. Leeson The question of the wealth of nations has been at the center of economics for more than two centuries. EARW(H)IG: I CAN’T HEAR YOU BECAUSE YOUR IDEAS ARE OLD 532 Boettke et al. theorists to be resurrected, but the subsequent professional and public debate has not resulted in the ‘Minsky moment’ becoming the main explanation for the crisis.1 Instead, John Maynard Keynes has captured the moment (see, e.g., Skidelsky, 2009) THE DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation Peter T. Leeson George Mason University Andrea M. Dean West Virginia University According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and “infect” PROFESSOR PETER T. LEESONCONTACTPAPERSPRESS Peter T. Leeson is the Duncan Black Professor of Economics and Law at George Mason University EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 conditions. Members of this subpopulation face an elevated risk of death if they become infected with COVID.4 For that reason many such people “locked themselves down” soon after COVID emerged. The cost they incur by doing so does not vary appreciably with the prevalence

WITCH TRIALS*

significantly, the former did not in general serve competitive ends by executing witch-prosecutors’ confessional rivals.5 Stalin’s show trials, in contrast, had the annihilation of his political opponents as one of their primary purposes and in this sense were

closer

AN-ARRGH-CHY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PIRATE ORGANIZATIONCREW OF A PIRATE SHIPMEMBERS OF A PIRATE CREWPIRATE JOBSDEFINITION OF ARGH PIRATE TALKPIRATE ORGANIZATION NAMES law and economics of pirate organization 1053 timony of pirates themselves, form an important part of the historical record this article relies on.7 Finally, a few pirate captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734), whose captors ultimately released them, published ORDEALS - PETER LEESON Ordeals 693 crimes of which they were accused.4 My analysis uses rational choice theory to show how ordeals did just that. In doing so, I develop a law and economics of superstition. The law and economics of superstition explores the role that ob- GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 THE NEW COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY The Review of Austrian Economics, 18:3/4, 281–304, 2005. c 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands. The New Comparative Political Economy PETER J. BOETTKE pboettke@gmu.edu Department of Economics, MSN 3G4, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES Christopher J. Coyne and Peter T. Leeson The question of the wealth of nations has been at the center of economics for more than two centuries. EARW(H)IG: I CAN’T HEAR YOU BECAUSE YOUR IDEAS ARE OLD 532 Boettke et al. theorists to be resurrected, but the subsequent professional and public debate has not resulted in the ‘Minsky moment’ becoming the main explanation for the crisis.1 Instead, John Maynard Keynes has captured the moment (see, e.g., Skidelsky, 2009) THE DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation Peter T. Leeson George Mason University Andrea M. Dean West Virginia University According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and “infect” CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONS 3 with one another. Criminals cannot rely on government to create or enforce laws governing their activities or interactions. 3 Further, criminal organizations may find it difficult to secure cooperation among their members because their members are criminals. THE DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation Peter T. Leeson George Mason University Andrea M. Dean West Virginia University According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and “infect”

THINK TANKS

Think Tanks* Peter T. Leeson† Matt E. Ryan‡ Claudia R. Williamson§ Abstract This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between think tanks and economic

PETER T. LEESON

2009] The Invisible Hook 141 Nobel Prize–winning economist Gary Becker was the first to ap-ply the logic of rational-choice decision making to criminals.2 Follow- ing him, a number of other scholars extended this logic to decision

HUMAN SACRIFICE

Human Sacrifice 141 My analysis contributes to the literature that, following Demsetz’s (1967) sem-inal work, explores the private emergence and enforcement of property rights.4 Johnsen’s (1986) contribution to this literature, which analyzes the potlatch system

TRIAL BY BATTLE

The vanquished lost his cause and, if he were unlucky, his life. People called these combats trials by battle.2 2 To modern observers trial by battle is an icon of medieval backwardness. Montesquieu called it ‘‘monstrous’’ (1748 : 563). PIRATIONAL CHOICE: THE ECONOMICS OF INFAMOUS PIRATE PRACTICES Pirational Choice: The Economics of Infamous Pirate Practices Peter T. Leesony Abstract This paper investigates the economics of infamous

pirate practices.

WE’RE ALL AUSTRIANS NOW: JÁNOS KORNAI AND THE AUSTRIAN We’re All Austrians Now: János Kornai and the Austrian School of Economics* Peter T. Leeson† George Mason University A review essay of János Kornai’s By Force of Thought: Irregular Memoirs of an Intellectual Journey. INSTITUTIONALLY CONSTRAINED TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION: RESOLVING Longbow Puzzle 685 tion 1990, p. 288; Strickland and Hardy 2011, p. 219). Historical documents show that both France and Scotland were keenly aware of the longbow’s effectiveness, BETTER OFF STATELESS: SOMALIA BEFORE AND AFTER GOVERNMENT 690 P.T. Leeson / Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (2007) 689–710 ppression by the governmenthas so much more baneful an effect on the springs of national prosperity, than almost any degree of lawlessness and turbulence under free institu-tions. Nations have acquired some wealth, and made some progress in improvement in states PROFESSOR PETER T. LEESONCONTACTPAPERSPRESS Peter T. Leeson is the Duncan Black Professor of Economics and Law at George Mason University EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 conditions. Members of this subpopulation face an elevated risk of death if they become infected with COVID.4 For that reason many such people “locked themselves down” soon after COVID emerged. The cost they incur by doing so does not vary appreciably with the prevalence

WITCH TRIALS*

significantly, the former did not in general serve competitive ends by executing witch-prosecutors’ confessional rivals.5 Stalin’s show trials, in contrast, had the annihilation of his political opponents as one of their primary purposes and in this sense were

closer

AN-ARRGH-CHY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PIRATE ORGANIZATIONCREW OF A PIRATE SHIPMEMBERS OF A PIRATE CREWPIRATE JOBSDEFINITION OF ARGH PIRATE TALKPIRATE ORGANIZATION NAMES law and economics of pirate organization 1053 timony of pirates themselves, form an important part of the historical record this article relies on.7 Finally, a few pirate captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734), whose captors ultimately released them, published ORDEALS - PETER LEESON Ordeals 693 crimes of which they were accused.4 My analysis uses rational choice theory to show how ordeals did just that. In doing so, I develop a law and economics of superstition. The law and economics of superstition explores the role that ob- GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 THE NEW COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY The Review of Austrian Economics, 18:3/4, 281–304, 2005. c 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands. The New Comparative Political Economy PETER J. BOETTKE pboettke@gmu.edu Department of Economics, MSN 3G4, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES Christopher J. Coyne and Peter T. Leeson The question of the wealth of nations has been at the center of economics for more than two centuries. EARW(H)IG: I CAN’T HEAR YOU BECAUSE YOUR IDEAS ARE OLD 532 Boettke et al. theorists to be resurrected, but the subsequent professional and public debate has not resulted in the ‘Minsky moment’ becoming the main explanation for the crisis.1 Instead, John Maynard Keynes has captured the moment (see, e.g., Skidelsky, 2009) THE DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation Peter T. Leeson George Mason University Andrea M. Dean West Virginia University According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and “infect” PROFESSOR PETER T. LEESONCONTACTPAPERSPRESS Peter T. Leeson is the Duncan Black Professor of Economics and Law at George Mason University EXTERNALITY AND COVID-19 conditions. Members of this subpopulation face an elevated risk of death if they become infected with COVID.4 For that reason many such people “locked themselves down” soon after COVID emerged. The cost they incur by doing so does not vary appreciably with the prevalence

WITCH TRIALS*

significantly, the former did not in general serve competitive ends by executing witch-prosecutors’ confessional rivals.5 Stalin’s show trials, in contrast, had the annihilation of his political opponents as one of their primary purposes and in this sense were

closer

AN-ARRGH-CHY: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF PIRATE ORGANIZATIONCREW OF A PIRATE SHIPMEMBERS OF A PIRATE CREWPIRATE JOBSDEFINITION OF ARGH PIRATE TALKPIRATE ORGANIZATION NAMES law and economics of pirate organization 1053 timony of pirates themselves, form an important part of the historical record this article relies on.7 Finally, a few pirate captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734), whose captors ultimately released them, published ORDEALS - PETER LEESON Ordeals 693 crimes of which they were accused.4 My analysis uses rational choice theory to show how ordeals did just that. In doing so, I develop a law and economics of superstition. The law and economics of superstition explores the role that ob- GYPSY LAW - PETER LEESON Public Choice (2013) 155:273–292 DOI 10.1007/s11127-012-0048-4 Gypsy law Peter T. Leeson Received: 23 November 2012 / Accepted: 25 November 2012 / Published online: 7 December 2012 THE NEW COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY The Review of Austrian Economics, 18:3/4, 281–304, 2005. c 2005 Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. Manufactured in The Netherlands. The New Comparative Political Economy PETER J. BOETTKE pboettke@gmu.edu Department of Economics, MSN 3G4, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030 THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES THE PLIGHT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES Christopher J. Coyne and Peter T. Leeson The question of the wealth of nations has been at the center of economics for more than two centuries. EARW(H)IG: I CAN’T HEAR YOU BECAUSE YOUR IDEAS ARE OLD 532 Boettke et al. theorists to be resurrected, but the subsequent professional and public debate has not resulted in the ‘Minsky moment’ becoming the main explanation for the crisis.1 Instead, John Maynard Keynes has captured the moment (see, e.g., Skidelsky, 2009) THE DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation Peter T. Leeson George Mason University Andrea M. Dean West Virginia University According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and “infect” CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONS 3 with one another. Criminals cannot rely on government to create or enforce laws governing their activities or interactions. 3 Further, criminal organizations may find it difficult to secure cooperation among their members because their members are criminals. THE DEMOCRATIC DOMINO THEORY: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION The Democratic Domino Theory: An Empirical Investigation Peter T. Leeson George Mason University Andrea M. Dean West Virginia University According to the democratic domino theory, increases or decreases in democracy in one country spread and “infect”

THINK TANKS

Think Tanks* Peter T. Leeson† Matt E. Ryan‡ Claudia R. Williamson§ Abstract This paper is the first to investigate the relationship between think tanks and economic

PETER T. LEESON

2009] The Invisible Hook 141 Nobel Prize–winning economist Gary Becker was the first to ap-ply the logic of rational-choice decision making to criminals.2 Follow- ing him, a number of other scholars extended this logic to decision

HUMAN SACRIFICE

Human Sacrifice 141 My analysis contributes to the literature that, following Demsetz’s (1967) sem-inal work, explores the private emergence and enforcement of property rights.4 Johnsen’s (1986) contribution to this literature, which analyzes the potlatch system

TRIAL BY BATTLE

The vanquished lost his cause and, if he were unlucky, his life. People called these combats trials by battle.2 2 To modern observers trial by battle is an icon of medieval backwardness. Montesquieu called it ‘‘monstrous’’ (1748 : 563). PIRATIONAL CHOICE: THE ECONOMICS OF INFAMOUS PIRATE PRACTICES Pirational Choice: The Economics of Infamous Pirate Practices Peter T. Leesony Abstract This paper investigates the economics of infamous

pirate practices.

WE’RE ALL AUSTRIANS NOW: JÁNOS KORNAI AND THE AUSTRIAN We’re All Austrians Now: János Kornai and the Austrian School of Economics* Peter T. Leeson† George Mason University A review essay of János Kornai’s By Force of Thought: Irregular Memoirs of an Intellectual Journey. INSTITUTIONALLY CONSTRAINED TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION: RESOLVING Longbow Puzzle 685 tion 1990, p. 288; Strickland and Hardy 2011, p. 219). Historical documents show that both France and Scotland were keenly aware of the longbow’s effectiveness, BETTER OFF STATELESS: SOMALIA BEFORE AND AFTER GOVERNMENT 690 P.T. Leeson / Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (2007) 689–710 ppression by the governmenthas so much more baneful an effect on the springs of national prosperity, than almost any degree of lawlessness and turbulence under free institu-tions. Nations have acquired some wealth, and made some progress in improvement in states VITAE     PAPERS     PRESS

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