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SUMMARY OF ERIKSON, WRIGHT, AND MCIVER: STATEHOUSE Erikson, Wright, and McIver. 1993. Statehouse democracy: Public opinion and policy in the American states. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. X: Mean ideology in a state Y: Mean policy output Thesis: State politics are responsive to state public opinion. Generally, state political outcomes correlate very strongly with state ideology. Data is culled from 13 years' worth of regular telephone po SUMMARY OF JERVIS: HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION -- ADAM Jervis. 1968. Hypotheses on misperception. World Politics 20 (April): 454-79. Jervis challenges the rational-choice view of international relations by arguing that misperception can undermine the real-world accuracy of game theoretic models. Hypothesis 1: "Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images." SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF OYE: EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY Oye. 1986. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See Fearon 1998 for a formal contradiction to two points made here. First, Fearon claims that simplistic models like prisoner's dilemma are not the appropriate model to understand bargaining situations; they analyze how states might enforce coope SUMMARY OF LIPSET AND ROKKAN: PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER Lipset and Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. A study of which cleavages will define how parties form. Nice summary table on page 47. First: What are the important cleavages? There are two kinds of important cleavages (territorial and functional). National/regional (territorial) cleavages are those involved in defining the nation SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY -- ADAM BROWN Lijphart. 1999. Patterns of democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapters 1-4 call our attention to two competing types of democracy. The first, majoritarian or Westminster democracy, is what most people immediate think of when they think of democracy: A legislature elected by a simple majority of the voters governs, and voters throw the ruling party out if it governs poorly. SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES -- ADAM Lijphart. 1977. Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lijphart presents his arguments in favor of "consociational" democracy. The arguments in this book are somewhat dated; see Lijphart's updated version of these argument in his later book, Patterns of Democracy (1999). There are two main aspects of consociationalism: (1) a plural society with SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF ERIKSON, WRIGHT, AND MCIVER: STATEHOUSE Erikson, Wright, and McIver. 1993. Statehouse democracy: Public opinion and policy in the American states. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. X: Mean ideology in a state Y: Mean policy output Thesis: State politics are responsive to state public opinion. Generally, state political outcomes correlate very strongly with state ideology. Data is culled from 13 years' worth of regular telephone po SUMMARY OF JERVIS: HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION -- ADAM Jervis. 1968. Hypotheses on misperception. World Politics 20 (April): 454-79. Jervis challenges the rational-choice view of international relations by arguing that misperception can undermine the real-world accuracy of game theoretic models. Hypothesis 1: "Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images." SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF OYE: EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY Oye. 1986. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See Fearon 1998 for a formal contradiction to two points made here. First, Fearon claims that simplistic models like prisoner's dilemma are not the appropriate model to understand bargaining situations; they analyze how states might enforce coope SUMMARY OF LIPSET AND ROKKAN: PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER Lipset and Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. A study of which cleavages will define how parties form. Nice summary table on page 47. First: What are the important cleavages? There are two kinds of important cleavages (territorial and functional). National/regional (territorial) cleavages are those involved in defining the nation LIST OF ALL WP ACTION HOOKS AND FILTERS -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Detailed information about every action hook and filter used in WordPress. Makes Plugin API easier to use. Lists appearance, file location, and deprecation data for every hook. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF KEOHANE: AFTER HEGEMONY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Keohane. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. CHAPTER 5 MAIN ARGUMENT Realists have argued that rational choice leads to either hegemony or conflict. Institutionalists have sought to explain cooperation based on idealism, or something less than rationalism. Keohane seeks to demonstrate that rational choice (realists' SUMMARY OF DOWNS: INSIDE BUREAUCRACY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Downs. Inside bureaucracy. This summary focuses on chapters 8 and 9 of Downs's book. Bureaucracy is a system of hierarchy. Every official has superiors, equals, and subordinates. "These superior-subordinate relationships are especially important because every official's chances for improving his position in the bureau, including promotion, higher salary, and success in furthering policies favors" SUMMARY OF LIPSET AND ROKKAN: PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER Lipset and Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. A study of which cleavages will define how parties form. Nice summary table on page 47. First: What are the important cleavages? There are two kinds of important cleavages (territorial and functional). National/regional (territorial) cleavages are those involved in defining the nation SUMMARY OF ERIKSON, WRIGHT, AND MCIVER: STATEHOUSE Erikson, Wright, and McIver. 1993. Statehouse democracy: Public opinion and policy in the American states. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. X: Mean ideology in a state Y: Mean policy output Thesis: State politics are responsive to state public opinion. Generally, state political outcomes correlate very strongly with state ideology. Data is culled from 13 years' worth of regular telephone po SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF WOOD: THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC Wood. 1969. The creation of the American republic. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Main Idea: Wood gives a historical account of the development of key ideas/concepts and their effect on government during the American Revolution and beyond. Springing from a concept of single sovereignty used to justify independence from colonial rule, ideas of sovereignty were affected by democrat SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF DEMSETZ: TOWARD A THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS Demsetz. 1967. Toward a theory of property rights. American Economic Review 57 (May): 347-359. VARIABLES: Y: emergence of new property rights X: transactions costs relative to resource value. The gains of internalization become larger than the (transactions) costs of internalization. The long chain of causation: (1) Changes in technology or the opening of new markets create (2) changes in economi SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICIZED PRESIDENCY -- ADAM BROWN Moe. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The New Direction in American Politics, eds Chubb and Peterson. How can we explain the centralization and politicization of the presidency, beginning with FDR and ending with Reagan? Politicization and centralization are means by which presidents increase and solidify their power in relationship to other institutions, allowing them to create areputation
SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF JERVIS: HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION -- ADAM Jervis. 1968. Hypotheses on misperception. World Politics 20 (April): 454-79. Jervis challenges the rational-choice view of international relations by arguing that misperception can undermine the real-world accuracy of game theoretic models. Hypothesis 1: "Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images." SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF VAN EVERA: OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND THE CAUSES OF Van Evera. 1998. Offense, defense, and the causes of war. International Security 22 (spring): 5-43. MAIN ARGUMENT: "war is far more likely when conquest is easy shifts in the offense-defense balance have a large effect on the risk of war" (5). The shifts in the offense-defense balance can be either real or perceived, but shifts will affect the likelihood of war. SUMMARY OF OYE: EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY Oye. 1986. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See Fearon 1998 for a formal contradiction to two points made here. First, Fearon claims that simplistic models like prisoner's dilemma are not the appropriate model to understand bargaining situations; they analyze how states might enforce coope SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICIZED PRESIDENCY -- ADAM BROWN Moe. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The New Direction in American Politics, eds Chubb and Peterson. How can we explain the centralization and politicization of the presidency, beginning with FDR and ending with Reagan? Politicization and centralization are means by which presidents increase and solidify their power in relationship to other institutions, allowing them to create areputation
SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF JERVIS: HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION -- ADAM Jervis. 1968. Hypotheses on misperception. World Politics 20 (April): 454-79. Jervis challenges the rational-choice view of international relations by arguing that misperception can undermine the real-world accuracy of game theoretic models. Hypothesis 1: "Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images." SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF VAN EVERA: OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND THE CAUSES OF Van Evera. 1998. Offense, defense, and the causes of war. International Security 22 (spring): 5-43. MAIN ARGUMENT: "war is far more likely when conquest is easy shifts in the offense-defense balance have a large effect on the risk of war" (5). The shifts in the offense-defense balance can be either real or perceived, but shifts will affect the likelihood of war. SUMMARY OF OYE: EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY Oye. 1986. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See Fearon 1998 for a formal contradiction to two points made here. First, Fearon claims that simplistic models like prisoner's dilemma are not the appropriate model to understand bargaining situations; they analyze how states might enforce coope SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY -- ADAM BROWN Lijphart. 1999. Patterns of democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapters 1-4 call our attention to two competing types of democracy. The first, majoritarian or Westminster democracy, is what most people immediate think of when they think of democracy: A legislature elected by a simple majority of the voters governs, and voters throw the ruling party out if it governs poorly. SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES -- ADAM Lijphart. 1977. Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lijphart presents his arguments in favor of "consociational" democracy. The arguments in this book are somewhat dated; see Lijphart's updated version of these argument in his later book, Patterns of Democracy (1999). There are two main aspects of consociationalism: (1) a plural society with SUMMARY OF DOWNS: INSIDE BUREAUCRACY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Downs. Inside bureaucracy. This summary focuses on chapters 8 and 9 of Downs's book. Bureaucracy is a system of hierarchy. Every official has superiors, equals, and subordinates. "These superior-subordinate relationships are especially important because every official's chances for improving his position in the bureau, including promotion, higher salary, and success in furthering policies favors" SUMMARY OF ERIKSON, WRIGHT, AND MCIVER: STATEHOUSE Erikson, Wright, and McIver. 1993. Statehouse democracy: Public opinion and policy in the American states. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. X: Mean ideology in a state Y: Mean policy output Thesis: State politics are responsive to state public opinion. Generally, state political outcomes correlate very strongly with state ideology. Data is culled from 13 years' worth of regular telephone po SUMMARY OF VAN EVERA: OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND THE CAUSES OF Van Evera. 1998. Offense, defense, and the causes of war. International Security 22 (spring): 5-43. MAIN ARGUMENT: "war is far more likely when conquest is easy shifts in the offense-defense balance have a large effect on the risk of war" (5). The shifts in the offense-defense balance can be either real or perceived, but shifts will affect the likelihood of war. SUMMARY OF OYE: EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY Oye. 1986. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See Fearon 1998 for a formal contradiction to two points made here. First, Fearon claims that simplistic models like prisoner's dilemma are not the appropriate model to understand bargaining situations; they analyze how states might enforce coope SUMMARY OF FEARON: RATIONALIST EXPLANATIONS FOR WAR Fearon. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49 (3): 379-414. "On close inspection none of the rationalist arguments advanced in the literature holds up as an explanation because none addresses or adequately resolves the central puzzle, namely, that war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all wouldprefe
SUMMARY OF BRATTON AND VAN DE WALLE: DEMOCRATIC Bratton and Van de Walle. 1997. Democratic experiments in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thesis: Because political authority and institutions are so different in Africa, "we contend that these differences critically affect the dynamics and outcomes of distinctive democratization processes in the sub-Saharan region." Key process: political protest --> liberalization --> elections SUMMARY OF FEARON: BARGAINING, ENFORCEMENT, AND Fearon. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and international cooperation. International Organization 52 (spring): 269-305. See notes for Oye 1986 for a brief comparison of how Fearon disputes some of Oye's conclusions. The game has a few key elements: Two players Difficulty of detecting defections Discount factor The cost each side bears for holding out a little longer for a better deal and some other SUMMARY OF LAVER AND SHEPSLE: COALITIONS AND CABINET Laver and Shepsle. 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. American Political Science Review 84 (Sept): 873-890. Unlike passing a bill or "dividing a dollar," forming a coalition is not the end of politics, but the beginning. Thus, the last three decades' models about coalition-forming that are based on theories of voting in legislatures have missed the boat. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICIZED PRESIDENCY -- ADAM BROWN Moe. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The New Direction in American Politics, eds Chubb and Peterson. How can we explain the centralization and politicization of the presidency, beginning with FDR and ending with Reagan? Politicization and centralization are means by which presidents increase and solidify their power in relationship to other institutions, allowing them to create areputation
SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF JERVIS: HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION -- ADAM Jervis. 1968. Hypotheses on misperception. World Politics 20 (April): 454-79. Jervis challenges the rational-choice view of international relations by arguing that misperception can undermine the real-world accuracy of game theoretic models. Hypothesis 1: "Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images." SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF VAN EVERA: OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND THE CAUSES OF Van Evera. 1998. Offense, defense, and the causes of war. International Security 22 (spring): 5-43. MAIN ARGUMENT: "war is far more likely when conquest is easy shifts in the offense-defense balance have a large effect on the risk of war" (5). The shifts in the offense-defense balance can be either real or perceived, but shifts will affect the likelihood of war. SUMMARY OF OYE: EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY Oye. 1986. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See Fearon 1998 for a formal contradiction to two points made here. First, Fearon claims that simplistic models like prisoner's dilemma are not the appropriate model to understand bargaining situations; they analyze how states might enforce coope SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICIZED PRESIDENCY -- ADAM BROWN Moe. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The New Direction in American Politics, eds Chubb and Peterson. How can we explain the centralization and politicization of the presidency, beginning with FDR and ending with Reagan? Politicization and centralization are means by which presidents increase and solidify their power in relationship to other institutions, allowing them to create areputation
SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF JERVIS: HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION -- ADAM Jervis. 1968. Hypotheses on misperception. World Politics 20 (April): 454-79. Jervis challenges the rational-choice view of international relations by arguing that misperception can undermine the real-world accuracy of game theoretic models. Hypothesis 1: "Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images." SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF VAN EVERA: OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND THE CAUSES OF Van Evera. 1998. Offense, defense, and the causes of war. International Security 22 (spring): 5-43. MAIN ARGUMENT: "war is far more likely when conquest is easy shifts in the offense-defense balance have a large effect on the risk of war" (5). The shifts in the offense-defense balance can be either real or perceived, but shifts will affect the likelihood of war. SUMMARY OF OYE: EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY Oye. 1986. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See Fearon 1998 for a formal contradiction to two points made here. First, Fearon claims that simplistic models like prisoner's dilemma are not the appropriate model to understand bargaining situations; they analyze how states might enforce coope SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY -- ADAM BROWN Lijphart. 1999. Patterns of democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapters 1-4 call our attention to two competing types of democracy. The first, majoritarian or Westminster democracy, is what most people immediate think of when they think of democracy: A legislature elected by a simple majority of the voters governs, and voters throw the ruling party out if it governs poorly. SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES -- ADAM Lijphart. 1977. Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lijphart presents his arguments in favor of "consociational" democracy. The arguments in this book are somewhat dated; see Lijphart's updated version of these argument in his later book, Patterns of Democracy (1999). There are two main aspects of consociationalism: (1) a plural society with SUMMARY OF DOWNS: INSIDE BUREAUCRACY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Downs. Inside bureaucracy. This summary focuses on chapters 8 and 9 of Downs's book. Bureaucracy is a system of hierarchy. Every official has superiors, equals, and subordinates. "These superior-subordinate relationships are especially important because every official's chances for improving his position in the bureau, including promotion, higher salary, and success in furthering policies favors" SUMMARY OF ERIKSON, WRIGHT, AND MCIVER: STATEHOUSE Erikson, Wright, and McIver. 1993. Statehouse democracy: Public opinion and policy in the American states. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. X: Mean ideology in a state Y: Mean policy output Thesis: State politics are responsive to state public opinion. Generally, state political outcomes correlate very strongly with state ideology. Data is culled from 13 years' worth of regular telephone po SUMMARY OF VAN EVERA: OFFENSE, DEFENSE, AND THE CAUSES OF Van Evera. 1998. Offense, defense, and the causes of war. International Security 22 (spring): 5-43. MAIN ARGUMENT: "war is far more likely when conquest is easy shifts in the offense-defense balance have a large effect on the risk of war" (5). The shifts in the offense-defense balance can be either real or perceived, but shifts will affect the likelihood of war. SUMMARY OF OYE: EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY Oye. 1986. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See Fearon 1998 for a formal contradiction to two points made here. First, Fearon claims that simplistic models like prisoner's dilemma are not the appropriate model to understand bargaining situations; they analyze how states might enforce coope SUMMARY OF FEARON: RATIONALIST EXPLANATIONS FOR WAR Fearon. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49 (3): 379-414. "On close inspection none of the rationalist arguments advanced in the literature holds up as an explanation because none addresses or adequately resolves the central puzzle, namely, that war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all wouldprefe
SUMMARY OF BRATTON AND VAN DE WALLE: DEMOCRATIC Bratton and Van de Walle. 1997. Democratic experiments in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thesis: Because political authority and institutions are so different in Africa, "we contend that these differences critically affect the dynamics and outcomes of distinctive democratization processes in the sub-Saharan region." Key process: political protest --> liberalization --> elections SUMMARY OF FEARON: BARGAINING, ENFORCEMENT, AND Fearon. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and international cooperation. International Organization 52 (spring): 269-305. See notes for Oye 1986 for a brief comparison of how Fearon disputes some of Oye's conclusions. The game has a few key elements: Two players Difficulty of detecting defections Discount factor The cost each side bears for holding out a little longer for a better deal and some other SUMMARY OF LAVER AND SHEPSLE: COALITIONS AND CABINET Laver and Shepsle. 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. American Political Science Review 84 (Sept): 873-890. Unlike passing a bill or "dividing a dollar," forming a coalition is not the end of politics, but the beginning. Thus, the last three decades' models about coalition-forming that are based on theories of voting in legislatures have missed the boat. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY -- ADAM BROWN Lijphart. 1999. Patterns of democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapters 1-4 call our attention to two competing types of democracy. The first, majoritarian or Westminster democracy, is what most people immediate think of when they think of democracy: A legislature elected by a simple majority of the voters governs, and voters throw the ruling party out if it governs poorly. SUMMARY OF KEOHANE: AFTER HEGEMONY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Keohane. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. CHAPTER 5 MAIN ARGUMENT Realists have argued that rational choice leads to either hegemony or conflict. Institutionalists have sought to explain cooperation based on idealism, or something less than rationalism. Keohane seeks to demonstrate that rational choice (realists' SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES -- ADAM Lijphart. 1977. Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lijphart presents his arguments in favor of "consociational" democracy. The arguments in this book are somewhat dated; see Lijphart's updated version of these argument in his later book, Patterns of Democracy (1999). There are two main aspects of consociationalism: (1) a plural society with SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF LIPSET AND ROKKAN: PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER Lipset and Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. A study of which cleavages will define how parties form. Nice summary table on page 47. First: What are the important cleavages? There are two kinds of important cleavages (territorial and functional). National/regional (territorial) cleavages are those involved in defining the nation SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: PATTERNS OF DEMOCRACY -- ADAM BROWN Lijphart. 1999. Patterns of democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapters 1-4 call our attention to two competing types of democracy. The first, majoritarian or Westminster democracy, is what most people immediate think of when they think of democracy: A legislature elected by a simple majority of the voters governs, and voters throw the ruling party out if it governs poorly. SUMMARY OF KEOHANE: AFTER HEGEMONY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Keohane. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. CHAPTER 5 MAIN ARGUMENT Realists have argued that rational choice leads to either hegemony or conflict. Institutionalists have sought to explain cooperation based on idealism, or something less than rationalism. Keohane seeks to demonstrate that rational choice (realists' SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES -- ADAM Lijphart. 1977. Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lijphart presents his arguments in favor of "consociational" democracy. The arguments in this book are somewhat dated; see Lijphart's updated version of these argument in his later book, Patterns of Democracy (1999). There are two main aspects of consociationalism: (1) a plural society with SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF LIPSET AND ROKKAN: PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER Lipset and Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. A study of which cleavages will define how parties form. Nice summary table on page 47. First: What are the important cleavages? There are two kinds of important cleavages (territorial and functional). National/regional (territorial) cleavages are those involved in defining the nation SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF NEUSTADT: PRESIDENTIAL POWER -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Neustadt. 1960. Presidential power. Key Point: "Presidential power is the power to persuade." (11) Presidents are expected to do much more than their authority allows them to do. Persuasion and bargaining are the means that presidents use to influence policy. Not only do presidents need to bargain to influence other branches of government (particularly Congress), but presidents also must bargain SUMMARY OF DOWNS: INSIDE BUREAUCRACY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Downs. Inside bureaucracy. This summary focuses on chapters 8 and 9 of Downs's book. Bureaucracy is a system of hierarchy. Every official has superiors, equals, and subordinates. "These superior-subordinate relationships are especially important because every official's chances for improving his position in the bureau, including promotion, higher salary, and success in furthering policies favors" SUMMARY OF ERIKSON, WRIGHT, AND MCIVER: STATEHOUSE Erikson, Wright, and McIver. 1993. Statehouse democracy: Public opinion and policy in the American states. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. X: Mean ideology in a state Y: Mean policy output Thesis: State politics are responsive to state public opinion. Generally, state political outcomes correlate very strongly with state ideology. Data is culled from 13 years' worth of regular telephone po SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF JERVIS: HYPOTHESES ON MISPERCEPTION -- ADAM Jervis. 1968. Hypotheses on misperception. World Politics 20 (April): 454-79. Jervis challenges the rational-choice view of international relations by arguing that misperception can undermine the real-world accuracy of game theoretic models. Hypothesis 1: "Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images." SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE Moe. 1989. The politics of bureaucratic structure. In Chubb and Peterson. "American public bureaucracy is not designed to be effective." (267) Bureaucracies are defined by the political situation that determines their structural design. "Structural politics is interest group politics." (269) "If one seeks to understand why structural choices turn out as they do . . . it does not make muchsense t
LIST OF SOUTH CAROLINA REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS FROM You can make this list smaller by viewing only the lower chamber or only the upper chamber.. This list of legislators is accurate as of February 2011. Click on a member's name to learn more about him orher.
SUMMARY OF MELTZER AND RICHARDS: A RATIONAL THEORY OF THE Meltzer and Richards. 1981. A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of Political Economy 89 (5): 914-927. Although the model is more complex than this, here's the basic idea: People vary in how productive they are. Because productivity has a constant effect on your wage, those who cannot earn a higher wage than welfare would provide will choose not to work. SUMMARY OF LAVER AND SHEPSLE: COALITIONS AND CABINET Laver and Shepsle. 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. American Political Science Review 84 (Sept): 873-890. Unlike passing a bill or "dividing a dollar," forming a coalition is not the end of politics, but the beginning. Thus, the last three decades' models about coalition-forming that are based on theories of voting in legislatures have missed the boat. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF KEOHANE: AFTER HEGEMONY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Keohane. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. CHAPTER 5 MAIN ARGUMENT Realists have argued that rational choice leads to either hegemony or conflict. Institutionalists have sought to explain cooperation based on idealism, or something less than rationalism. Keohane seeks to demonstrate that rational choice (realists' SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICIZED PRESIDENCY -- ADAM BROWN Moe. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The New Direction in American Politics, eds Chubb and Peterson. How can we explain the centralization and politicization of the presidency, beginning with FDR and ending with Reagan? Politicization and centralization are means by which presidents increase and solidify their power in relationship to other institutions, allowing them to create areputation
SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES -- ADAM Lijphart. 1977. Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lijphart presents his arguments in favor of "consociational" democracy. The arguments in this book are somewhat dated; see Lijphart's updated version of these argument in his later book, Patterns of Democracy (1999). There are two main aspects of consociationalism: (1) a plural society with SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF LIPSET AND ROKKAN: PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER Lipset and Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. A study of which cleavages will define how parties form. Nice summary table on page 47. First: What are the important cleavages? There are two kinds of important cleavages (territorial and functional). National/regional (territorial) cleavages are those involved in defining the nation SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF KEOHANE: AFTER HEGEMONY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Keohane. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. CHAPTER 5 MAIN ARGUMENT Realists have argued that rational choice leads to either hegemony or conflict. Institutionalists have sought to explain cooperation based on idealism, or something less than rationalism. Keohane seeks to demonstrate that rational choice (realists' SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICIZED PRESIDENCY -- ADAM BROWN Moe. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The New Direction in American Politics, eds Chubb and Peterson. How can we explain the centralization and politicization of the presidency, beginning with FDR and ending with Reagan? Politicization and centralization are means by which presidents increase and solidify their power in relationship to other institutions, allowing them to create areputation
SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES -- ADAM Lijphart. 1977. Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lijphart presents his arguments in favor of "consociational" democracy. The arguments in this book are somewhat dated; see Lijphart's updated version of these argument in his later book, Patterns of Democracy (1999). There are two main aspects of consociationalism: (1) a plural society with SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF LIPSET AND ROKKAN: PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER Lipset and Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. A study of which cleavages will define how parties form. Nice summary table on page 47. First: What are the important cleavages? There are two kinds of important cleavages (territorial and functional). National/regional (territorial) cleavages are those involved in defining the nation SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF DOWNS: INSIDE BUREAUCRACY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Downs. Inside bureaucracy. This summary focuses on chapters 8 and 9 of Downs's book. Bureaucracy is a system of hierarchy. Every official has superiors, equals, and subordinates. "These superior-subordinate relationships are especially important because every official's chances for improving his position in the bureau, including promotion, higher salary, and success in furthering policies favors" SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF ERIKSON, WRIGHT, AND MCIVER: STATEHOUSE Erikson, Wright, and McIver. 1993. Statehouse democracy: Public opinion and policy in the American states. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. X: Mean ideology in a state Y: Mean policy output Thesis: State politics are responsive to state public opinion. Generally, state political outcomes correlate very strongly with state ideology. Data is culled from 13 years' worth of regular telephone po SUMMARY OF DAHL: THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH IN POLITICAL Dahl. 1961. The behavioral approach in political science: Epitaph for a monument to a successful protest. APSR. In his presidential address to APSA, Dahl explores what the behavioral revolution (already nearing completion) was. Essentially, he sees it as a protest against impressionistic, less scientific work. Behavior is not a field; it is an approach, a way of viewing problems. SUMMARY OF FEARON: RATIONALIST EXPLANATIONS FOR WAR Fearon. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49 (3): 379-414. "On close inspection none of the rationalist arguments advanced in the literature holds up as an explanation because none addresses or adequately resolves the central puzzle, namely, that war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all wouldprefe
SUMMARY OF FEARON: BARGAINING, ENFORCEMENT, AND Fearon. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and international cooperation. International Organization 52 (spring): 269-305. See notes for Oye 1986 for a brief comparison of how Fearon disputes some of Oye's conclusions. The game has a few key elements: Two players Difficulty of detecting defections Discount factor The cost each side bears for holding out a little longer for a better deal and some other SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE Moe. 1989. The politics of bureaucratic structure. In Chubb and Peterson. "American public bureaucracy is not designed to be effective." (267) Bureaucracies are defined by the political situation that determines their structural design. "Structural politics is interest group politics." (269) "If one seeks to understand why structural choices turn out as they do . . . it does not make muchsense t
LIST OF SOUTH CAROLINA REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS FROM You can make this list smaller by viewing only the lower chamber or only the upper chamber.. This list of legislators is accurate as of February 2011. Click on a member's name to learn more about him orher.
SUMMARY OF LAVER AND SHEPSLE: COALITIONS AND CABINET Laver and Shepsle. 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. American Political Science Review 84 (Sept): 873-890. Unlike passing a bill or "dividing a dollar," forming a coalition is not the end of politics, but the beginning. Thus, the last three decades' models about coalition-forming that are based on theories of voting in legislatures have missed the boat. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF KEOHANE: AFTER HEGEMONY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Keohane. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. CHAPTER 5 MAIN ARGUMENT Realists have argued that rational choice leads to either hegemony or conflict. Institutionalists have sought to explain cooperation based on idealism, or something less than rationalism. Keohane seeks to demonstrate that rational choice (realists' SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES -- ADAM Lijphart. 1977. Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lijphart presents his arguments in favor of "consociational" democracy. The arguments in this book are somewhat dated; see Lijphart's updated version of these argument in his later book, Patterns of Democracy (1999). There are two main aspects of consociationalism: (1) a plural society with SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICIZED PRESIDENCY -- ADAM BROWN Moe. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The New Direction in American Politics, eds Chubb and Peterson. How can we explain the centralization and politicization of the presidency, beginning with FDR and ending with Reagan? Politicization and centralization are means by which presidents increase and solidify their power in relationship to other institutions, allowing them to create areputation
SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF LIPSET AND ROKKAN: PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER Lipset and Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. A study of which cleavages will define how parties form. Nice summary table on page 47. First: What are the important cleavages? There are two kinds of important cleavages (territorial and functional). National/regional (territorial) cleavages are those involved in defining the nation SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF KEOHANE: AFTER HEGEMONY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Keohane. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. CHAPTER 5 MAIN ARGUMENT Realists have argued that rational choice leads to either hegemony or conflict. Institutionalists have sought to explain cooperation based on idealism, or something less than rationalism. Keohane seeks to demonstrate that rational choice (realists' SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES -- ADAM Lijphart. 1977. Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lijphart presents his arguments in favor of "consociational" democracy. The arguments in this book are somewhat dated; see Lijphart's updated version of these argument in his later book, Patterns of Democracy (1999). There are two main aspects of consociationalism: (1) a plural society with SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICIZED PRESIDENCY -- ADAM BROWN Moe. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The New Direction in American Politics, eds Chubb and Peterson. How can we explain the centralization and politicization of the presidency, beginning with FDR and ending with Reagan? Politicization and centralization are means by which presidents increase and solidify their power in relationship to other institutions, allowing them to create areputation
SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF LIPSET AND ROKKAN: PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER Lipset and Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. A study of which cleavages will define how parties form. Nice summary table on page 47. First: What are the important cleavages? There are two kinds of important cleavages (territorial and functional). National/regional (territorial) cleavages are those involved in defining the nation SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF DOWNS: INSIDE BUREAUCRACY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Downs. Inside bureaucracy. This summary focuses on chapters 8 and 9 of Downs's book. Bureaucracy is a system of hierarchy. Every official has superiors, equals, and subordinates. "These superior-subordinate relationships are especially important because every official's chances for improving his position in the bureau, including promotion, higher salary, and success in furthering policies favors" SUMMARY OF LIPSET AND ROKKAN: PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER Lipset and Rokkan. 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives. Toronto: The Free Press. A study of which cleavages will define how parties form. Nice summary table on page 47. First: What are the important cleavages? There are two kinds of important cleavages (territorial and functional). National/regional (territorial) cleavages are those involved in defining the nation SUMMARY OF ERIKSON, WRIGHT, AND MCIVER: STATEHOUSE Erikson, Wright, and McIver. 1993. Statehouse democracy: Public opinion and policy in the American states. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. X: Mean ideology in a state Y: Mean policy output Thesis: State politics are responsive to state public opinion. Generally, state political outcomes correlate very strongly with state ideology. Data is culled from 13 years' worth of regular telephone po SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF DAHL: THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH IN POLITICAL Dahl. 1961. The behavioral approach in political science: Epitaph for a monument to a successful protest. APSR. In his presidential address to APSA, Dahl explores what the behavioral revolution (already nearing completion) was. Essentially, he sees it as a protest against impressionistic, less scientific work. Behavior is not a field; it is an approach, a way of viewing problems. SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE Moe. 1989. The politics of bureaucratic structure. In Chubb and Peterson. "American public bureaucracy is not designed to be effective." (267) Bureaucracies are defined by the political situation that determines their structural design. "Structural politics is interest group politics." (269) "If one seeks to understand why structural choices turn out as they do . . . it does not make muchsense t
SUMMARY OF FEARON: BARGAINING, ENFORCEMENT, AND Fearon. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and international cooperation. International Organization 52 (spring): 269-305. See notes for Oye 1986 for a brief comparison of how Fearon disputes some of Oye's conclusions. The game has a few key elements: Two players Difficulty of detecting defections Discount factor The cost each side bears for holding out a little longer for a better deal and some other SUMMARY OF FEARON: RATIONALIST EXPLANATIONS FOR WAR Fearon. 1995. Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization 49 (3): 379-414. "On close inspection none of the rationalist arguments advanced in the literature holds up as an explanation because none addresses or adequately resolves the central puzzle, namely, that war is costly and risky, so rational states should have incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all wouldprefe
LIST OF SOUTH CAROLINA REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATORS FROM You can make this list smaller by viewing only the lower chamber or only the upper chamber.. This list of legislators is accurate as of February 2011. Click on a member's name to learn more about him orher.
SUMMARY OF LAVER AND SHEPSLE: COALITIONS AND CABINET Laver and Shepsle. 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. American Political Science Review 84 (Sept): 873-890. Unlike passing a bill or "dividing a dollar," forming a coalition is not the end of politics, but the beginning. Thus, the last three decades' models about coalition-forming that are based on theories of voting in legislatures have missed the boat. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICIZED PRESIDENCY -- ADAM BROWN Moe. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The New Direction in American Politics, eds Chubb and Peterson. How can we explain the centralization and politicization of the presidency, beginning with FDR and ending with Reagan? Politicization and centralization are means by which presidents increase and solidify their power in relationship to other institutions, allowing them to create areputation
SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF FEARON: BARGAINING, ENFORCEMENT, AND Fearon. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and international cooperation. International Organization 52 (spring): 269-305. See notes for Oye 1986 for a brief comparison of how Fearon disputes some of Oye's conclusions. The game has a few key elements: Two players Difficulty of detecting defections Discount factor The cost each side bears for holding out a little longer for a better deal and some other SUMMARY OF OYE: EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY Oye. 1986. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See Fearon 1998 for a formal contradiction to two points made here. First, Fearon claims that simplistic models like prisoner's dilemma are not the appropriate model to understand bargaining situations; they analyze how states might enforce coope SUMMARY OF LAVER AND SHEPSLE: COALITIONS AND CABINET Laver and Shepsle. 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. American Political Science Review 84 (Sept): 873-890. Unlike passing a bill or "dividing a dollar," forming a coalition is not the end of politics, but the beginning. Thus, the last three decades' models about coalition-forming that are based on theories of voting in legislatures have missed the boat. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICIZED PRESIDENCY -- ADAM BROWN Moe. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The New Direction in American Politics, eds Chubb and Peterson. How can we explain the centralization and politicization of the presidency, beginning with FDR and ending with Reagan? Politicization and centralization are means by which presidents increase and solidify their power in relationship to other institutions, allowing them to create areputation
SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ONADAMBROWN.INFO
SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF FEARON: BARGAINING, ENFORCEMENT, AND Fearon. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and international cooperation. International Organization 52 (spring): 269-305. See notes for Oye 1986 for a brief comparison of how Fearon disputes some of Oye's conclusions. The game has a few key elements: Two players Difficulty of detecting defections Discount factor The cost each side bears for holding out a little longer for a better deal and some other SUMMARY OF OYE: EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY Oye. 1986. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See Fearon 1998 for a formal contradiction to two points made here. First, Fearon claims that simplistic models like prisoner's dilemma are not the appropriate model to understand bargaining situations; they analyze how states might enforce coope SUMMARY OF LAVER AND SHEPSLE: COALITIONS AND CABINET Laver and Shepsle. 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. American Political Science Review 84 (Sept): 873-890. Unlike passing a bill or "dividing a dollar," forming a coalition is not the end of politics, but the beginning. Thus, the last three decades' models about coalition-forming that are based on theories of voting in legislatures have missed the boat. SUMMARY OF ERIKSON, WRIGHT, AND MCIVER: STATEHOUSE Erikson, Wright, and McIver. 1993. Statehouse democracy: Public opinion and policy in the American states. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. X: Mean ideology in a state Y: Mean policy output Thesis: State politics are responsive to state public opinion. Generally, state political outcomes correlate very strongly with state ideology. Data is culled from 13 years' worth of regular telephone po SUMMARY OF DOWNS: INSIDE BUREAUCRACY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Downs. Inside bureaucracy. This summary focuses on chapters 8 and 9 of Downs's book. Bureaucracy is a system of hierarchy. Every official has superiors, equals, and subordinates. "These superior-subordinate relationships are especially important because every official's chances for improving his position in the bureau, including promotion, higher salary, and success in furthering policies favors" SUMMARY OF NEUSTADT: PRESIDENTIAL POWER -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Neustadt. 1960. Presidential power. Key Point: "Presidential power is the power to persuade." (11) Presidents are expected to do much more than their authority allows them to do. Persuasion and bargaining are the means that presidents use to influence policy. Not only do presidents need to bargain to influence other branches of government (particularly Congress), but presidents also must bargain SUMMARY OF ROSENSTONE AND HANSEN: MOBILIZATION Rosenstone and Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, participation, and American democracy. The book addresses two main questions: Why people turn out, and why turnout has declined over time. Citizens participate based on their personal costs and benefits of doing so, but that's only half the story: they also participate when politicians mobilize them. SUMMARY OF WILKINSON: VOTES AND VIOLENCE -- ADAM BROWN Wilkinson. 2004. Votes and violence: Electoral competition and ethnic riots in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A political theory of ethnic (religious, racial, linguistic) violence: When politicians need minority support, they prevent violence. When they don't, they don't. And if they need to incite ethnic polarization (e.g. in order to bring more of their ethnic group into the major SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES -- ADAM Lijphart. 1977. Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lijphart presents his arguments in favor of "consociational" democracy. The arguments in this book are somewhat dated; see Lijphart's updated version of these argument in his later book, Patterns of Democracy (1999). There are two main aspects of consociationalism: (1) a plural society with SUMMARY OF SCHATTSCHNEIDER: PARTY GOVERNMENT -- ADAM BROWN Schattschneider. 1942. Party government. "The political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties." "A political party is an organized attempt to get control of the government." "The parties live in a highly competitive world." "The Democratic party is not an association of the twenty-seven million people who voted for Mr. Roosevelt in November,194
SUMMARY OF DAHL: THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH IN POLITICAL Dahl. 1961. The behavioral approach in political science: Epitaph for a monument to a successful protest. APSR. In his presidential address to APSA, Dahl explores what the behavioral revolution (already nearing completion) was. Essentially, he sees it as a protest against impressionistic, less scientific work. Behavior is not a field; it is an approach, a way of viewing problems. SUMMARY OF VERBA AND NIE: PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA -- ADAM Verba and Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality. New York: Harper and Row. Socioeconomic forces (but also group consciousness, community size, party membership, etc) affect 'who' participates. This, in turn, affects what opinions government 'responds' to. See the flowchart on pg 22 (and on pp.18-22).
PREVIEW_PAGE_LINK WORDPRESS HOOK DETAILS -- ADAM BROWN This hook does not occur in the most recent version of WordPress (5.7). Do not use it. It is deprecated. You should look at the list of "related hooks" below to see if you can figure out what replaced it. We find related hooks using word stems. preview_page_link has 3 significant word stem (s): preview, page, link. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICIZED PRESIDENCY -- ADAM BROWN Moe. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The New Direction in American Politics, eds Chubb and Peterson. How can we explain the centralization and politicization of the presidency, beginning with FDR and ending with Reagan? Politicization and centralization are means by which presidents increase and solidify their power in relationship to other institutions, allowing them to create areputation
SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ON ADAMBROWN.INFOFUNDAMENTAL OF CALCULUS THEORYTHE CALCULUS WARSCALCULUS DEFINITIONCALCULUS OF VOTING FORMULAPOLITICAL CALCULUSTHEORETICALCALCULUS
SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF FEARON: BARGAINING, ENFORCEMENT, ANDBARGAINING DEFINITION HEALTHCOLLECTIVE BARGAINING DEFINITION Fearon. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and international cooperation. International Organization 52 (spring): 269-305. See notes for Oye 1986 for a brief comparison of how Fearon disputes some of Oye's conclusions. The game has a few key elements: Two players Difficulty of detecting defections Discount factor The cost each side bears for holding out a little longer for a better deal and some other SUMMARY OF OYE: EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHYDEFINITION OF COOPERATIONEXAMPLES OF COOPERATION FOR KIDSLETTER OF COOPERATIONTYPES OF COOPERATIONIN COOPERATION WITH MEANINGTHE IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATION Oye. 1986. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See Fearon 1998 for a formal contradiction to two points made here. First, Fearon claims that simplistic models like prisoner's dilemma are not the appropriate model to understand bargaining situations; they analyze how states might enforce coope SUMMARY OF LAVER AND SHEPSLE: COALITIONS AND CABINET Laver and Shepsle. 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. American Political Science Review 84 (Sept): 873-890. Unlike passing a bill or "dividing a dollar," forming a coalition is not the end of politics, but the beginning. Thus, the last three decades' models about coalition-forming that are based on theories of voting in legislatures have missed the boat. SUMMARY OF WALZER: THE IDEA OF CIVIL SOCIETY -- ADAM BROWN Walzer. 1991. The idea of civil society: A path to social reconstruction. Dissent 39 (Spring): 293-304. From (a very good) handout: The Problem: In E. Europe (post '89) social networks need to be rebuilt. In the West, civil society has become enervated. "he networks through which civility is produced and reproduced" have been"neglected" .
SUMMARY OF COPELAND: THE ORIGINS OF MAJOR WAR -- ADAM Copeland. 2000. The origins of major war. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. I've got a nice PDF summary of this. Copeland begins with a critique of three historical realist theories: classical realism, neorealism (Waltz), and hegemonic stability theory. He presents his new theory: dynamic differentials theory. This theory looks at how changing relative capabilities (i.e. "dynamic differentials") SUMMARY OF MOE: THE POLITICIZED PRESIDENCY -- ADAM BROWN Moe. 1985. The politicized presidency. In The New Direction in American Politics, eds Chubb and Peterson. How can we explain the centralization and politicization of the presidency, beginning with FDR and ending with Reagan? Politicization and centralization are means by which presidents increase and solidify their power in relationship to other institutions, allowing them to create areputation
SUMMARY OF ROGOWSKI: POLITICAL CLEAVAGES AND CHANGING Rogowski. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81 (December): 1121-1137. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem says that trade liberalization benefits holders of abundant resources but hurts holders of scarce resources. Rogowski extends this to its logical conclusion, which is that changes in a state's exposure to trade should have profound effects on SUMMARY OF STEIN: WHEN MISPERCEPTION MATTERS -- ADAM BROWN Stein. 1982. When misperception matters. World Politics 34 (July): 505-526. Point: Misperception does not always affect an actor's choices or determine outcome. Indeed, Stein argues that when misperception does matter, it is in a much narrower range than previously thought, and that misperception can lead to cooperation aswell as conflict.
SUMMARY OF RIKER AND ORDESHOOK: A THEORY OF THE CALCULUSSEE MORE ON ADAMBROWN.INFOFUNDAMENTAL OF CALCULUS THEORYTHE CALCULUS WARSCALCULUS DEFINITIONCALCULUS OF VOTING FORMULAPOLITICAL CALCULUSTHEORETICALCALCULUS
SUMMARY OF RISSE-KAPPEN: COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN A Risse-Kappen. 1996. Collective identity in a democratic community: The case of NATO. In Culture of National Security, ed. Katzenstein, pp. 357-399. From a critical paper: "Risse-Kappen (1996) argues that realists (or what he calls "sophisticated realists," such as Walt and presumably Morrow) do not adequately explain the formation, cooperation, and continuation of NATO. SUMMARY OF FEARON: BARGAINING, ENFORCEMENT, ANDBARGAINING DEFINITION HEALTHCOLLECTIVE BARGAINING DEFINITION Fearon. 1998. Bargaining, Enforcement, and international cooperation. International Organization 52 (spring): 269-305. See notes for Oye 1986 for a brief comparison of how Fearon disputes some of Oye's conclusions. The game has a few key elements: Two players Difficulty of detecting defections Discount factor The cost each side bears for holding out a little longer for a better deal and some other SUMMARY OF OYE: EXPLAINING COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHYDEFINITION OF COOPERATIONEXAMPLES OF COOPERATION FOR KIDSLETTER OF COOPERATIONTYPES OF COOPERATIONIN COOPERATION WITH MEANINGTHE IMPORTANCE OF COOPERATION Oye. 1986. Explaining cooperation under anarchy: Hypotheses and strategies. In Cooperation under Anarchy, ed. Oye, Princeton: Princeton University Press. See Fearon 1998 for a formal contradiction to two points made here. First, Fearon claims that simplistic models like prisoner's dilemma are not the appropriate model to understand bargaining situations; they analyze how states might enforce coope SUMMARY OF LAVER AND SHEPSLE: COALITIONS AND CABINET Laver and Shepsle. 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. American Political Science Review 84 (Sept): 873-890. Unlike passing a bill or "dividing a dollar," forming a coalition is not the end of politics, but the beginning. Thus, the last three decades' models about coalition-forming that are based on theories of voting in legislatures have missed the boat. SUMMARY OF ERIKSON, WRIGHT, AND MCIVER: STATEHOUSE Erikson, Wright, and McIver. 1993. Statehouse democracy: Public opinion and policy in the American states. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. X: Mean ideology in a state Y: Mean policy output Thesis: State politics are responsive to state public opinion. Generally, state political outcomes correlate very strongly with state ideology. Data is culled from 13 years' worth of regular telephone po SUMMARY OF DOWNS: INSIDE BUREAUCRACY -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Downs. Inside bureaucracy. This summary focuses on chapters 8 and 9 of Downs's book. Bureaucracy is a system of hierarchy. Every official has superiors, equals, and subordinates. "These superior-subordinate relationships are especially important because every official's chances for improving his position in the bureau, including promotion, higher salary, and success in furthering policies favors" SUMMARY OF NEUSTADT: PRESIDENTIAL POWER -- ADAM BROWN, BYU Neustadt. 1960. Presidential power. Key Point: "Presidential power is the power to persuade." (11) Presidents are expected to do much more than their authority allows them to do. Persuasion and bargaining are the means that presidents use to influence policy. Not only do presidents need to bargain to influence other branches of government (particularly Congress), but presidents also must bargain SUMMARY OF ROSENSTONE AND HANSEN: MOBILIZATION Rosenstone and Hansen. 1993. Mobilization, participation, and American democracy. The book addresses two main questions: Why people turn out, and why turnout has declined over time. Citizens participate based on their personal costs and benefits of doing so, but that's only half the story: they also participate when politicians mobilize them. SUMMARY OF WILKINSON: VOTES AND VIOLENCE -- ADAM BROWN Wilkinson. 2004. Votes and violence: Electoral competition and ethnic riots in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A political theory of ethnic (religious, racial, linguistic) violence: When politicians need minority support, they prevent violence. When they don't, they don't. And if they need to incite ethnic polarization (e.g. in order to bring more of their ethnic group into the major SUMMARY OF LIJPHART: DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES -- ADAM Lijphart. 1977. Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lijphart presents his arguments in favor of "consociational" democracy. The arguments in this book are somewhat dated; see Lijphart's updated version of these argument in his later book, Patterns of Democracy (1999). There are two main aspects of consociationalism: (1) a plural society with SUMMARY OF SCHATTSCHNEIDER: PARTY GOVERNMENT -- ADAM BROWN Schattschneider. 1942. Party government. "The political parties created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties." "A political party is an organized attempt to get control of the government." "The parties live in a highly competitive world." "The Democratic party is not an association of the twenty-seven million people who voted for Mr. Roosevelt in November,194
SUMMARY OF DAHL: THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH IN POLITICAL Dahl. 1961. The behavioral approach in political science: Epitaph for a monument to a successful protest. APSR. In his presidential address to APSA, Dahl explores what the behavioral revolution (already nearing completion) was. Essentially, he sees it as a protest against impressionistic, less scientific work. Behavior is not a field; it is an approach, a way of viewing problems. SUMMARY OF VERBA AND NIE: PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA -- ADAM Verba and Nie. 1972. Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality. New York: Harper and Row. Socioeconomic forces (but also group consciousness, community size, party membership, etc) affect 'who' participates. This, in turn, affects what opinions government 'responds' to. See the flowchart on pg 22 (and on pp.18-22).
PREVIEW_PAGE_LINK WORDPRESS HOOK DETAILS -- ADAM BROWN This hook does not occur in the most recent version of WordPress (5.7). Do not use it. It is deprecated. You should look at the list of "related hooks" below to see if you can figure out what replaced it. We find related hooks using word stems. preview_page_link has 3 significant word stem (s): preview, page, link.Adam R Brown
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I am an associate professor of political science at Brigham Young University; a faculty scholar with BYU's Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy ; and the 2018-2021 Mollie and Karl Butler Young Scholar at the Redd Center for Western Studies . I completed a PhD at UC SanDiego in 2008.
My research leverages differences among the American states to draw broader inferences about governance. You may download my CVor view my Google
Scholar profile
. I teach
courses on state politics, public lands, Utah government, and Americanpolitics generally.
UTAHNS: Are you looking for my Guide to the Utah Legislatureor my Guide to
the Utah Constitution? I've also
written a book on Utah politics.
My wife, Janelle, is a full-time mom, part-time harpist, and all-time rockstar. We have three boys whose awesomeness defies description. If I'm not in the office or wrangling the kids, you can usually find me wandering the mountains. Actually, usually you can't. That's sort ofthe point.
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brown@byu.edu
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California redwoods (2017) Old North Bridge: Where the Revolution began (2017)Canyonlands (2017)
Frozen Utah Lake (2016) Mt Timpanogos: World's most majestic toilet (2016) Shooting our pumpkins (2016)San Diego (2016)
Backpacking the Uintahs (2016) Philadelphia's Independence Hall (2016) Camping at Diamond Fork (2016)Bryce Canyon (2016)
Sledding Big Spring (2016) Drinking rain at Sundance (2015)Snow Canyon (2015)
Seatbelts saved us in a rollover (2015)Mesa Verde (2015)
Hovenweep (2015)
Flyfishing the Uintahs (2015)Capitol Reef (2015)
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POLI 325 field trip to Arches (2015) Springtime in Yellowstone (2014) Fishing at Wasatch Mountain (2014)My boys (2013)
My family (2013)
Hiking through Little Wildhorse Canyon (2013) Sunset while backpacking at Hayden Lake (2013) Walking from Turret Arch to the South Window (2013) Ascending Buffalo Peak in autumn (2013) Entering Rock Canyon early in the spring (2013) The Utah Capitol (2012) Autumn aspen behind Mt Timpanogos (2010) Site of the Boston Massacre (2010) Plimoth Plantation, Massachusetts (2010) They grow so fast (2010) He was so little (2009) How was he ever so small? (2008)Happy family (2007)
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